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ÖZET 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi 
İran’ın Nükleer Programının Analizi ve Türkiye Üzerindeki Etkileri 
İrem KARAKIR 
 
Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi 
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü 
İngilizce Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı 
İngilizce Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı 
 
 
 
İran’ın nükleer programının uluslararası, bölgesel ve ulusal olmak üzere 
üç farklı boyutu vardır.  Bu tez, Iran’ın nükleer programının uluslararası, 
bölgesel ve ulusal boyutunu sorgulamayı amaçlamaktadır.  Uluslararası 
boyutuna ilişkin olarak, uluslararası toplumun İran’ın nükleer programı 
karşısındaki tutumu ABD, AB, Rusya ve Çin gibi başlıca güçlerin 
yaklaşımlarının detaylı incelenmesi suretiyle analiz edilmektedir.  Ulusal boyuta 
ilişkin olarak, bu tez nükleer konuya dair İran’ın iç dinamiklerini, özellikle 
nükleer faaliyeti sürdürme yönündeki tartışmalar ve radikal ve ılımlı 
muhafazakarlar, pragmatikler ve reformistler gibi siyasi gruplar ile İran 
kamuoyunun konu ile ilgili tutumları üzerine odaklanarak incelemektedir.   Şu 
anda, gerek farklı siyasi gruplar arasında gerekse İran toplumu içerisinde 
nükleer konunun ne şekilde ele alınması gerektiği yönünde herhangi bir 
mutabakat bulunmamaktadır.   Yine de tüm bu siyasi gruplar ve İran 
kamuoyu, İran’ın nükleer programına barışçıl amaçlarla devam etmesi 
konusunda anlaşmaktadır.  Son olarak, bölgesel boyuta ilişkin olarak, 
Türkiye’nin İran’ın nükleer programı karşısındaki tutumu ve bu tutumu 
benimsemesinin arkasındaki nedenler analiz edilmektedir.  Nükleer konunun 
diğer belli başlı konulardan ayrı tutularak incelenmesinin zorluğu göz önünde 
bulundurularak İran’ın nükleer programının etkileri etraflı bir yaklaşım 
çerçevesinde incelenmektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İran’ın nükleer programı, uluslararası toplum, İran iç siyaseti, 
Türk-İran ilişkileri, IAEA.
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Iranian nuclear issue has three divergent dimensions as international, 
regional and domestic.   This thesis aims to address the international, regional 
and domestic dimensions of the Iranian nuclear issue.  With respect to its 
international dimension, attitude of the international community toward Iran’s 
nuclear programme is analyzed with a detailed overview of the approaches of 
major powers such as the USA, the EU, Russia and China.   With respect to its 
domestic aspect, this thesis analyzes Iranian domestic dynamics on the nuclear 
issue, focusing particularly on the domestic arguments for assertion on the 
nuclear activity and the attitudes of political factions –radical and mainstream 
conservatives, pragmatists and reformists, and the Iranian public toward the 
nuclear activity.  Presently, there is no agreement either among divergent 
political factions or within the public on how the handle the nuclear issue, 
though they all agree on the right of Iran to continue its nuclear programme for 
peaceful purposes.  Finally, with respect to its regional dimension, the Turkish 
attitude toward the Iranian nuclear issue and motives for adopting this attitude 
is analyzed by particularly focusing at the recent relations between the two 
countries in relation to the nuclear issue.  Accepting the difficulty to address one 
issue in isolation from other major bilateral issues, repercussion of the nuclear 
issue is analysed by adopting a comprehensive approach. 
 
Key Words: Iran’s nuclear programme, international community, Iranian domestic 
politics, Turkish-Iranian relations, IAEA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Iranian nuclear programme has three dimensions as international, regional 
and domestic. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the concerns of 
the international community regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, leading to a 
parallel increase in the literature questioning the international dimension of the issue.  
In this regard, there has been an attempt to analyze the attitudes of major powers on 
the Iranian nuclear issue including the US, the EU/EU-3, Russia and China.  
Regional dimension of the issue has as well attracted broad attention.  There has been 
strong emphasis on the potential expansion of nuclear proliferation in the Middle 
East, since Iranian nuclear programme have resulted in the “sudden awakening of 
several Middle Eastern countries that, now feeling threatened by Iran, see the urge to 
jump onto the nuclear bandwagon.” 1  Other than international and regional 
dimensions, domestic dimension of the Iranian nuclear issue has also been significant 
since the Iranian nuclear dispute can only partially be solved externally as the 
interplay of internal dynamics are critical as well in determining the direction of the 
nuclear dispute.  
It is true that external pressure via sanctions or incentives has been influential 
in promoting change in the attitude of the Iranian regime toward its nuclear 
programme. However, this change has been temporary since an alteration in Iran’s 
political administrative structure resulted in Iran’s restarting its uranium enrichment 
programme that was suspended in the aftermath of the negotiations with the 
EU/EU3, accompanied by the Paris agreement.  Thus, permanent solution to Iranian 
nuclear dispute also requires a change in the attitude of the Iranian regime to be 
sponsored by internal pressure.  Thus it is difficult to analyze Iranian nuclear dispute 
without any one of these three dimensions.  This thesis aims to examine each of these 
dimensions of the Iranian nuclear issue at length.   
In an attempt to address the international, regional and domestic dimension of 
Iranian nuclear issue, this thesis is divided into three main chapters.  The first 
                                               
1
 Claude Salhani, “Analysis: Middle East Nuclear Renaissance?” Middle East Times, 23.06.2008, 
http://www.metimes.com/Security/2008/06/23/analysis_middle_east_nuclear_renaissance/0214/  
(28.06.2008) 
 2 
chapter, titled “Attitudes of the Major Countries Toward Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” 
aims to interrogate the attitudes of the US, the EU/EU-3, Russia and China on Iran’s 
nuclear programme. The underlying question in the chapter is whether there can be a 
consensus in the international community for a comprehensive settlement. In trying 
to provide answer to this question first, the first chapter briefly reviews foreign 
assistance in the development of Iran’s nuclear programme until the halt of the 
Western assistance. Secondly, focusing separately on the US, the EU/EU-3, Russia 
and China, a comparative analysis is employed for delineating similarities and 
differences in their attitudes and concerns since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This 
chapter arrives at a tentative conclusion on the basis that the debate is likely to 
continue, as there is no common attitude toward Iran’s nuclear puzzle in the 
international community. 
The second chapter titled “Iranian Nuclear Issue: Domestic Debates,” 
analyzes Iranian domestic dynamics on the nuclear issue, focusing particularly on the 
domestic arguments for assertion on the nuclear activity and the attitudes of political 
factions –radical and mainstream conservatives, pragmatists and reformists, and the 
Iranian public toward the nuclear activity. Presently, there is no agreement either 
among divergent political factions or within the public on how the handle the nuclear 
issue, though they all agree on the right of Iran to continue its nuclear programme for 
peaceful purposes. Iranian government rejects any nuclear deal offered by the major 
world powers that demands a suspension of its uranium enrichment. Iran repeatedly 
has called for resumption of talks to resolve the nuclear issue within the framework 
of the IAEA and without preconditions. This chapter argues that with the 
modification of Iran’s official attitude with the coming elections in 2009 the course 
of negotiations with the international community might improve. 
The third chapter titled “Iranian Nuclear Issue: Implications for Turkey,” 
aims to analyse the Turkish attitude toward the Iranian nuclear issue and motives for 
adopting this attitude by particularly focusing at the recent relations between the two 
countries in relation to the nuclear issue. Accepting the difficulty to address one issue 
in isolation from other major bilateral issues, repercussion of the nuclear issue is 
analysed by adopting a comprehensive approach. After a short review of the 
historical problems and cooperation between the two countries, geopolitical concerns 
 3 
of Turkey in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia are explained. Then two 
major fields of concern, which are significant in their recent bilateral relations, 
namely security and energy are evaluated. This chapter concludes that the Turkish 
attitude toward the Iranian nuclear issue is closer to the European than the American 
approach. Accordingly, Ankara supports the EU-3’s efforts to provide a negotiated 
solution through diplomacy and Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA in finding a 
solution to the nuclear issue. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ATTITUDES OF THE MAJOR COUNTRIES TOWARD IRAN’S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAMME 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Iran’s nuclear programme –which Iran has stated is for peaceful/non-military 
purposes, that is energy production, whereas the Western countries regard it to be 
driven by military ambitions, has been a subject of international concern. In fact, 
since 2002 the present and future capacity of Iran’s nuclear programme is questioned 
and evaluated by the international community. In this regard, considerable attention 
has been paid to Iran’s nuclear programme in security and strategic studies in the last 
years. 
Iran has started investing in nuclear technology at the late 1950’s. During 
monarchy under the Shah, the Western countries had assisted Iran in acquiring 
nuclear infrastructure, whereas with the Islamic Revolution in 1979, there was a 
sudden halt in assistance, which led Iran to look for other potential suppliers such as 
China and the former Soviet Union. Iran’s nuclear programme became a critical issue 
for the USA, particularly since the 1990’s with the Russian assistance to Iran’s 
nuclear programme and critical for the EU and the international community when the 
IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) of the UN started inspections to 
document whether Iran has produced uranium sufficient for nuclear weapons–after 
the discovery in August 2002 that Iran had hidden its nuclear activities for eighteen 
years. 
Today, there is a significant nuclear dispute between the USA and Iran, while 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, abbreviated as the EU-3, are trying to 
resolve the confrontation by using diplomacy. The Bush administration claims that 
Iran enriches uranium and hides information, thus poses a threat, though US 
intelligence declared in December 2007 that Iran has stopped active involvement in 
its nuclear weapons programme in 2003, which has complicated things for US 
argument to escalate sanctions on Iran. The UN Security Council has already passed 
 5 
two sets of sanctions against Iran for its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment–a 
process that can provide fuel for a nuclear reactor or fissile material for a nuclear 
bomb. More than eighteen months after the first UN sanctions were imposed, little 
has been achieved. Thus recently, the five permanent UN Security Council members 
plus Germany agreed on a draft of the new sanction package, which was approved in 
February 2008.2  
The response of Iran to outside pressure regarding the nuclear issue is highly 
important in determining the nature and scope of attitude of the international 
community. The Iranian President Ahmadinejad claims that the sanctions were based 
on false information, since Iran’s nuclear programme seeks only to generate 
electricity, and thus Iran accepts the IAEA as the only body with jurisdiction over the 
nuclear issue.3 Furthermore, the rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad, particularly on 
Iran’s nuclear programme and toward Israel–what US Secretary of State Nicholas 
Burns calls ‘the most abhorrent, irresponsible rhetoric of any global leader in many 
years,’ has brought Iran closer to a confrontation with the USA.4 Lately, State Radio 
of Iran reported that Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamani said on 18 
February 2008, ‘God would punish Iranians if they do not support the country’s 
disputed nuclear programme.’ Furthermore, he said, ‘They (the USA) know that Iran 
is not pursuing a nuclear weapon, and they (the USA) are just trying to block the 
Iranian nation from achieving advanced technology.’5 
There are several explanations of Iran’s insistence to continue with the 
uranium enrichment programme. First, the Iranian officials argue that Iran’s oil and 
gas reserves are sufficient to meet its public energy demands in the short-term, 
however, in the long-term it is argued that Iran’s oil and gas reserves will be not be 
sufficient. Thus, Iran needs alternative energy resources to meet its domestic 
demand. A second impetus in Iran for the nuclear programme is security. There is a 
                                               
2
 John Heilprin, “UN Powers: More Sanctions on Iran”, TIME, 24.01.2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1706827,00.html (04.02.2008) 
3
 “Iran: Bush is ‘Confrontational’ ”, TIME, 17.012008,  
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1704786,00.html (04.02.2008) 
4
 Scott MacLeod, “Iran’s War Within”, TIME, 15.03.2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1599710,00.html (05.02.2008) 
5
 ‘Iran’s Supreme Leader: God will Reprimand Iranians if They Give up Nuclear Activity’, 
International Herald Tribune, 18.02.2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/17/news/Iran-
Nuclear.php (12.06.2008) 
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belief that Iran must have sufficient deterrence against outside forces.6 Yet, Iran’s 
military intent was much clearer in the pre-1979 nuclear programme, whereas after 
the regime change in Iraq, Iran has been stressing the peaceful purpose of the 
programme for energy production.7 Apart from these rationalist accounts, the quest 
for nuclear programme has become a matter of international prestige and pride–
recognition of Iran’s high status among other regional actors. Iran’s insistence on 
international respect is also supported by its strong desire for self-reliance and 
independence.8 In this respect, Iran’s nuclear discourse has been expressed as an 
element of three main discourses, including independence, justice and resistance. 
Iran emphasizes self-sufficiency within the discourse of independence, and demand 
for the recognition of its right to nuclear technology within the discourse of justice. 
However, recently there is more emphasis on resistance within Iran’s nuclear 
discourse.9  
Whatever the real intentions of Iran are in enriching uranium, the 
international community’s suspicion over Iran’s nuclear intentions has not changed 
since 2003. As noted in the Economist on 2nd-8th February 2008,  ‘the Americans and 
Europeans, supported by Russia and China, promised that halt to enrichment would 
win Iran improved political and economic ties, talks on regional security and help 
with advanced, but less suspect, nuclear technology.’ Hitherto, we cannot talk about 
a common approach of the international community toward Iran in general, and 
toward Iran’s nuclear programme in particular, and thus in this respect, this article 
aims to interrogate the attitudes of the USA, the EU/EU-3, Russia and China on 
Iran’s nuclear programme. The underlying question is whether there can be a 
consensus in the international community for a comprehensive settlement that could 
bring positive outcomes for regional peace. In trying to provide answers to this 
question first, we have briefly reviewed historical foreign assistance in the 
development of Iran’s nuclear programme. Since there has been growing literature 
                                               
6
 Ray Takeyh, “Iran Build the Bomb”, Survival, Vol.46, No.4, , 2004-05, pp. 52-54. 
7
 Tim Guldimann, “The Iranian Nuclear Impasse”, Survival, Vol.49, No.3, 2007, p. 169. 
8
 Guldimann, p. 172 
9
 Homeria Moshirzadeh, “Discursive Foundations of Iran’s Nuclear Policy”, Security Dialogue, 
Vol.38, No.4, 2007, pp. 521-543. 
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on the history of Iran’s nuclear programme10, we have preferred not to analyse at 
length but focus on the literature in this context. Secondly, we have examined in 
depth the international community’s attitudes toward Iran’s nuclear programme after 
the 1979 Iranian Revolution. In so doing, focusing separately on the USA, the 
EU/EU-3, Russia and China, which are the parties mainly concerned on the issue, we 
employ a comparative analysis for delineating similarities and differences in their 
attitudes and concerns. This essay arrived at a tentative conclusion regarding the 
strategic debate on Iran’s nuclear programme and what strategies should be chosen to 
deal with it, on the basis that the debate is likely to continue as there is no common 
comprehensive agreement in the international community, whether Iran is capable of 
acquiring a nuclear capability and if endangering the peace in the Middle East as 
much of the globe. Yet, it seems that there is a common agreement in the Western 
international community that Iran must not have nuclear weapons. Although Russia 
and China have some concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme, they prefer US 
unilateral action towards Iran rather than participating in a US-led pressure group. 
Besides, China and Russia favor dialogue rather than containment. Meanwhile Iran 
consistently insists that its purposes are peaceful.   
 
1.2 HISTORICAL VIEW OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO IRAN’S 
NUCLEAR PROGRAMME 
 
Several characteristics can be identified on foreign assistance in the evolution 
of Iran’s nuclear programme. First of all, it was the USA that encouraged Iran to 
acquire nuclear energy under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, since during the 
Cold War containing the Soviet expansionism and securing oil reserves were two 
main concerns of US foreign policy in the Middle East.  During the monarchy a 
nuclear programme was designed to give the Shah an option of assembling a nuclear 
bomb if his regional competitors move in that direction.11 “Iran’s initial nuclear 
programme started in the mid-1950s, when Mohammad Reza Shah signed a civilian 
                                               
10
 Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the 
West,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.43, No.2, 2007, pp. 223-245; Gawdat Bahgat, “Nuclear 
Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran,” Iranian Studies, Vol.39, No.3, 2006, pp. 307-327. 
11
 Colin Dueck and Ray Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear Challange,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.122, 
No.2, 2007, p. 190. 
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‘atoms for peace’ agreement with the Eisenhower administration and later received 
an American research reactor for the Tehran Nuclear Research Center.”12 Following 
the civil nuclear cooperation agreement of 1957 between the USA and Iran, the USA 
provided Iran with technical assistance along with the first experimental nuclear 
reactor.13 The USA has established a thermal reactor in 1967 at the Tehran Research 
Center and trained Iranian technicians.14 Furthermore in 1968, Iran signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which allowed Iran to develop research 
concerning production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  
In addition to US assistance, France and Germany have also contributed in 
the development of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure during the monarchy. For example, 
in 1974 the French company Framatome in Darkhovin initiated construction of two 
water reactors. In 1975, Iran purchased a 10 percent share in Eurodif, a joint venture 
uranium enrichment company of France, Belgium, Spain and Italy. In 1976, the 
German Siemens firm constructed two nuclear facilities in Bushehr. Iran 
accomplished nuclear fuel contracts with Germany in 1976 and with France in 
1977.15 
However, in the beginning of the 1980’s and during the war with Iraq, Iran 
did not continue with the nuclear programme.16 In the immediate aftermath of the 
Islamic revolution of 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of Iran, froze 
nuclear energy development, claiming that nuclear power was against the Islamic 
beliefs. Yet, with the recognition that modern military technology could make a 
difference in war with Iraq and due to the severe energy crisis in the post-
revolutionary period, Iran renewed its intention to develop nuclear energy17.  On the 
other hand, the USA decided to end all the nuclear agreements with Iran in 1979.18 In 
                                               
12
 Jahangir Amuzegar, “Nuclear Iran: Perils and Prospects,” Middle East Policy, Vol.13, No.2, 2006, 
p. 91. 
13
 Stephen Zunes, ‘The US and Iran: Democracy, Terrorism and Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Policy 
in Focus (FPIF), 25.07.2005, http://www.fpif.org (10.11.2006). 
14
 Sherifa D. Zuhur, “Iran, Iraq, and the US: The New Triangle’s Impact on Secterianism and the 
Nuclear Threat”, Strategic Studies Institute, 2006, p. 54,  http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute. 
army.mil (05.02.2008). 
15
 Kibaroglu, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West,” 
p. 231. 
16
 Dueck and Takeyh, p. 190. 
17
 Kibaroglu, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West,” 
p. 234 
18
 Zuhur, p. 54 
 9 
particular, US encouragement of Iran’s nuclear policy under the Shah regime turned 
into a preventive policy.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from this brief review is foreign assistance 
has played a crucial role in building Iran’s nuclear programme. Yet, attitude of the 
Western countries has changed toward Iran’s search for nuclear power technology 
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.19 Due to this radical shift in the role of the West in 
the construction of nuclear infrastructure of Iran, Iran turned its face to other 
potential states such as Pakistan, Argentina, Spain, Czechoslovakia, China and the 
Soviet Union. For example, Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with 
Pakistan and Argentina in 1987. Yet, particularly the former Soviet Union and China 
emerged as possible alternatives for nuclear assistance. However, the Chinese 
assistance in the beginning of the 1990’s has not last long due to US protests to China 
and thus, Russia has become the only potential supplier.20  
 
1.3 ATTITUDE OF THE WEST TOWARD IRAN’S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAMME  
 
The Western attitudes toward Iran’s nuclear programme is analyzed not as 
total, but as the US attitude and the EU/EU-3 attitude in order to differentiate 
similarities and differences. Analysing first the US attitude toward Iran in general, it 
is observed that the US-Iranian relations have changed after the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution and US embassy take over by militants in Tehran. Particularly, the 
dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme has kept tensions between Iran and the US 
high. Since the Reagan administration, the USA has tried to delay Iran’s nuclear 
programme and tried to prevent substantial international cooperation with Iran’s 
nuclear industry. For instance, the US President Reagan has terminated German 
cooperation with Iran.21 Furthermore, the US President Clinton banned US 
companies from investing in Iran’s oil industry. He signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions 
Act to impose sanctions against foreign firms investing more than 20 million dollars 
                                               
19
 Kibaroglu, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West,” 
pp. 223-245. 
20
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in Iran’s oil and gas industry.22 In 1998, the US President Clinton waived sanctions 
against the French and Russian companies planning to develop Iran’s south gas 
field.23 Furthermore, the Clinton administration applied a policy of ‘dual 
containment’ to control both Iran and Iraq until 1998. According to this strategy the 
USA would no longer attempt to play Iran and Iraq off against each other, and 
instead would contain both. Moreover, the USA has included Iran in the list of 
‘rouge states’ during the Clinton administration and among the states sponsoring 
terrorism. 
Yet, with the election of reform-minded moderate Iranian President Khatami 
in 1997, the USA shifted its policy from ‘dual containment’ to ‘limited 
rapprochement’. Thus, there was more optimism about improvement of relations 
between the USA and Iran. Nonetheless, this optimism has ended six years ago when 
the US President George W. Bush has labeled Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea 
as the ‘axis of evil’–endangering peace in the globe. After 11 September 2001 
concerned with terrorism, proliferation and availability of weapons of mass 
destruction, organized crime and regional conflicts, the US President Bush has 
changed US policy toward Iran back to containment.  
Iran’s nuclear programme became more a confrontational issue between the 
USA and Iran with the 2005 presidential election in Iran. The new Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad has given up President Khatami’s ‘dialogue of civilizations’ for more 
confrontational rhetoric, particularly on the USA and Israel. In his speeches President 
Ahmadinejad has indicated that Iran supports Hizballah and Hamas in their 
confrontation with Israel, accused the USA over the occupation of Iraq and teased 
the USA on military action against Iran. Furthermore, President Ahmadinejad 
repeatedly said that Iran has right and will not abandon uranium enrichment despite 
the Western fears. Thus, in 2006 the National Security Strategy of the USA, Iran is 
considered as the main country challenging the USA by seeking to develop nuclear 
weapons, refusing to provide the IAEA access to nuclear sites and also, due to 
aggressive statements of the Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Furthermore, in the 
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same strategy it is indicated that the USA is concerned about Iran’s violation of the 
NPT, sponsoring terrorism, and threatening Israel.24  
Accordingly, within the framework of active containment policy over the past 
few years, the Bush administration has argued for both ‘regime change’ and for the 
increase of economic sanctions towards Iran.25  Another characteristic of the active 
containment policy was the USA’s search for the support of the other major powers 
to contain Iran. Hitherto, though the USA did not have any diplomatic relations with 
Iran, has allowed alternative diplomatic track carried by the EU-3 toward Iran.26 
Nevertheless, the USA and Iran held their first official direct talks in May 2007 to 
discuss the security situation in Iraq.27 Furthermore, the Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice offered Iran direct talks on Iran’s disputed nuclear programme in 
2006 on the condition that Iran suspends its nuclear enrichment, which was rejected 
by Iran.  
Besides the search for the support of the other major powers to contain Iran, 
the USA has also applied unilateral action, particularly in the international financial 
system. In mid 2007, the USA prohibited transactions with three Iranian financial 
institutions; Bank Melli, Bank Mellat and Bank Saderat. To convince the European 
allies to intensify the UN sanctions on Iran, in October 2007 the USA charged the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps of providing material support for terrorist 
organizations. US pressure on credit institutions has particularly effected Germany, 
France, Japan and India’s trade relations with Iran.28 Furthermore, in October 2007, 
N. Burns, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, told in a briefing on Iran 
‘Now, we very much hope that the Security Council will take up its responsibilities 
and pass a third Security Council resolution on the nuclear issue in the shortest 
possible time. But the United States, of course, has always reserved the right to act 
independently.’29 Above and beyond, in his speeches the US President Bush 
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mentioned several times that all options including military option are ‘on the table’ 
with respect to the Iran’s nuclear issue. Furthermore, the US National Security 
Strategies of 2002 and of 2006 have shown the Bush administration’s willingness to 
act preemptively vis-à-vis imminent threats.  
Furthermore, the USA searches for the collaboration of Arab allies in active 
containment policy. Burns stated, ‘Iran has transferred arms to Hamas and to 
Hezbollah in Lebanon and to the Shia militant groups in Iraq and to the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. And so Iran has willfully violated the UN Security Council 
resolution.’30 Thus, the US administration has accused Iran of destabilizing the Iraqi 
government by supporting radical Shiite militant groups-which is denied by the Iraqi 
government, and accused of destabilizing the Karzai government in Afghanistan by 
channeling weapons to Taliban –which is denied by the Karzai government.31 In 
January 2008, the US President Bush has visited the Middle East to get support from 
Arab allies against Iran. During the Middle East trip, the US President Bush told that 
the extremists supported by the Iranian regime are threatening the stability in the 
Middle East. He blamed Iran of sponsoring the terrorists groups, intimidating its 
neighbors and refusing to be open and transparent about its nuclear programme and 
ambitions.32  
However, in November 2007, the American National Intelligence Estimate 
stated that in 2003 Iran halted its nuclear weapons programme in response to foreign 
pressure, and as of mid 2007 had not restarted. Regarding this report, it can be 
argued that Iran currently does not have a nuclear weapon, thus threat is not 
imminent. If Iran were to restart the stalled programme, it would not be before late 
2009, and probably a lot more, technically capable of producing enough nuclear 
material to construct a bomb.33 This information contradicts the Bush 
administration’s remarks on Iran pursuing the technology of uranium enrichment34, 
which might lead to World War III, and reduces significance of the argument that 
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military action is necessary to stop Iran developing nuclear weapons.35 Nevertheless, 
on 8 February in the International Herald Tribune it is reported that Iran has begun to 
deploy a new generation of machinery–centrifuges known as IR-2, to produce 
nuclear fuel. This development is expected to be included in the IAEA report in 
February 2008.36 In this respect, despite the NIE findings, there are hesitations in the 
USA about Iran’s nuclear programme. Furthermore, the US President Bush has made 
it clear that he disagreed with the idea that the recent intelligence estimate report 
lowered the threat coming from Iran.37  
To conclude, so far tension between Iran and the USA has remained high 
over Iran’s nuclear activities. Whereas, Iran claims that the NPT permitted Iran to 
enrich uranium for civilian use, the USA insists that Iran’s so-called ‘peaceful’ 
programme is in reality ‘a cover for the ultimate development of nuclear weapons 
and a threat to its interests in the region as well as Israel’s security and survival.’38 
Iran is a signatory of the NPT and it is legal for any signatory of the NPT to enrich 
uranium for civilian purposes under the IAEA monitoring, but the USA is concerned 
that once technology is mastered, Iran might withdraw from the NPT. Today, the 
USA considers that heightened sanctions, tougher sanctions and increased isolation 
of Iran besides diplomacy are required to stop Iran’s quest for nuclear capability.39 
As the draft of third UN Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran is 
prepared lately, the US administration officials publicly say that the Security Council 
members plus Germany remain united in maintaining pressure on Iran. The Bush 
administration officials are trying to convince the international community to 
increase the pressure on Iran. Nonetheless, the Bush administration keeps the 
military option -including air strikes to nuclear facilities on the table. 
The literature on other options besides military strikes is diverse, presenting 
several positions and approaches to prevent a military confrontation between Iran 
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and the US: (i) starting a ‘grand bargain’ with Iran40; (ii) starting a limited nuclear 
deal; (iii) accepting Iran’s nuclear capability and trying to deter nuclear Iran. 
Carpenter has considered that the third option is problematic, and identifies a ‘grand 
bargain’ as the best option to get Iran to give up its quest for nuclear weapons. Yet, 
Carpenter also has stated that if Iran turns down the proposal for a ‘grand bargain’, 
the US could rely on deterrence.41 ‘Grand bargain’ is based on the belief that the 
Iranian regime will honestly provide a complete list of their nuclear facilities and will 
agree to dismantle them; however, Iran’s deceptions caused the USA to mistrust Iran. 
Furthermore, Hollis has considered that the potential for the USA and Iran to achieve 
a ‘grand bargain’ is remote, since both sides still have wider regional confrontation 
in other issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.42 Takeyh, the top Iran analysts 
at the US Council on foreign relations, has argued that rather than ‘grand bargain’ the 
US should prefer the second option, i.e. a targeted nuclear deal and more concerted 
negotiations.43 The Swiss Ambassador Guldimann has also prefered a dialogue rather 
than increasing sanctions.44 However, a deal with Iran that accepts some level of 
domestic enrichment activity has its own costs and dangers as suggested by 
Firtzpatrick. A deal would confer a right to enrichment, preventing the Western 
allies’ ability to obstruct Iran’s foreign procurement effort, and the IAEA’s ability to 
detect the presence of undeclared enrichment activity will slow down. Furthermore, 
whether or not the Western allies employ a deal, Iran might continue its enrichment 
programme since Iran has already refused to comply with the UN Security Council 
decisions.45 In the meantime, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 
has advised the third option, i.e. the USA should try to form a deterrence policy in 
the Middle East region, and discuss forming an association with NATO in the 
Middle East.46 
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Analysis of another part of the Western attitudes, the relationship between the 
EU and Iran in general and the attitude of the EU-3 toward Iran’s nuclear programme 
in particular since the Islamic Revolution, can be divided into three phases. The first 
phase began with the Islamic revolution of 1979 and continued until the election of 
Rafsanjani as the Iranian President. Even though the EU Member States were still 
interested in the Iranian natural resources along with the Iranian market, in the 
immediate aftermath of the Islamic revolution a sense of deterioration dominated this 
relationship, owing to the overall hostile attitude of the new Iranian regime toward 
the West, arising from the support of the West to the former Shah regime. 
Furthermore, the radical rhetoric of the outstanding spiritual guide Ayatollah 
Khomeinie against the West and Israel, along with the cases of human rights abuses 
contributed to the worsening of the relations between Iran and the EU. Overall, 
throughout this first phase, the EU had been critical about Iran’s human rights record, 
support given to terrorist activities and its nuclear programme.  
The second phase in the Iran–EU relationship began in 1989 with the new 
Iranian President Rafsanjani. Some improvement in the Iran-EU relations occurred 
during Rafsanjani’s Presidency (1989-1997), which was marked by economic 
pragmatism through the realization of a number of economic reforms.47 At the 
European Council Meeting in Edinburgh, in December 1992, the EU Member States 
decided to follow a common approach toward Iran, called ‘Critical Dialogue’. 
Through ‘Critical Dialogue,’ the EU Member States, particularly France, Germany 
and the UK, aimed to moderate Iran with respect to its posture in a number of issues 
such as its nuclear programme, human rights record and terrorism, organizing regular 
meetings between Iran and the EU. However, the EU’s official policy of ‘Critical 
Dialogue’ toward Iran halt with the Mykonos Case in 1997, which revealed the 
connection between the Iranian government and the assassination of political 
opponents to the Iranian regime in Germany. 48 
Thirdly, the attitude of the EU-3 toward Iran’s nuclear programme entered 
into a new phase with the election of moderate Mohammed Khatami as the President 
in 1997. During Khatami’s Presidency, a number of political and economic reforms 
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were implemented in Iran, which led to the declaration of a ‘Comprehensive 
Dialogue’ by the EU-3 toward Iran. Satisfied with the brand new reforms in Iran, the 
EU-3 believed that comprehensive engagement with Iran would further curb any 
extremism in Iran’s attitude in the nuclear issue.  In fact, Iran’s nuclear programme 
had not caused any serious concern from the EU-3’s perspective until 2002.  
Following the IAEA’s alarming findings, the EU-3 tried to persuade Iran to suspend 
its uranium enrichment programme and to sign the Additional Protocol with the 
IAEA–allowing further inspections in return for not taking the issue before the UN 
Security Council and providing Iran with civil nuclear technology.49 Thus, the EU-3 
intensively conducted negotiations with Iran to reach an agreement. During 
negotiations, the major strategy followed by the EU-3 negotiators was offering Iran 
economic incentives to suspend uranium enrichment and allowing inspection by the 
IAEA. 
In this respect, in November 2004, with the Paris Agreement among the 
Iranian government and the E3/EU, negotiations between Iran and the EU were 
concluded. With this agreement the Iranian government agreed to suspend its 
uranium enrichment and reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT, as well as to full 
cooperation and transparency with the IAEA, whereas the EU-3 agreed to respect to 
Iran’s rights under the NPT. As Afrasiabi and Kibaroglu pointed out ‘the Paris 
Agreement was nonetheless an important benchmark that set the European standards 
for dealing with Iran.’50 Yet, the Paris Agreement was able to accomplish suspension 
of Iran’s uranium enrichment programme temporarily, and therefore what the EU-3 
countries achieved with the Paris agreement was not a long-term solution to the 
problem. Iran has restarted uranium enrichment at the Esfahan plant in August 
2005.51 In order to convince Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment programme 
permanently, the EU-3 sought to improve trade relations between Iran and the EU. 
Here, the underlying logic was that through intensive cooperation in the field of 
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trade, credibility of each side would gradually increase in the eyes of the other, thus 
enabling further negotiations on the nuclear issue more fruitful. 
Yet, in contrast to the expectations of the EU-3, with the election of 
Admadinejad as the Iranian President in 2005, the negotiations between the two sides 
have no more been productive given the uncompromising stance of the Iranian 
President Admadinejad with respect to the nuclear issue. In fact, the EU-3 has 
preferred diplomacy to convince Iran to act in a transparent manner complying with 
the international treaties. The EU-3’s method of diplomacy included reciprocal 
negotiations, trade relations and cooperation on a number of issues. In this respect, 
the EU-3 has differed from the USA as the EU-3 has argued that sanctions would not 
be effective in dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme. In fact, even though the EU is 
accepted as a ‘soft power’, pragmatism still has its share in shaping the EU’s attitude 
toward Iran, since ‘Europe is Iran’s largest trading partner and has much to lose if the 
present linkage diplomacy translated in the future to an EU trade embargo on Iran.’52 
Yet, following Iran’s violation of the Paris Agreement the EU reviewed its approach 
to Iran and issued a statement condemning in the strongest terms the comments made 
by President Ahmadinejad.53 
The analysis of the EU/EU-3 attitudes shows that overall, the EU/EU-3 wants 
Iran to act in accordance with the decisions of the IAEA and the UN Security 
Council and continues to exert pressure on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment 
activities permanently. Despite Iran’s insistence on the peacefulness of its nuclear 
programme, like the USA, the EU/EU-3 fears that Iran would use its nuclear 
technology to construct nuclear weapons. However, unlike the USA, which keeps on 
to argue on the efficiency of tough sanctions and even military operation option 
against Iran, the EU/EU-3 has avoided a hot conflict with Iran believing that an 
isolated Iran would be radicalized. Thus, instead of punishing Iran with harsh 
economic sanctions and with the threat of a military option, the EU has used 
diplomacy and economic tactics to persuade Iran. This strategy of the EU has also 
been influenced by the attractiveness of ‘Iranian oil, the large market it offers, and its 
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strategic location in the Persian Gulf and as a gateway for natural resources from 
Central Asian countries.’54  
Nevertheless, recognizing that diplomatic option was far from helping to 
build any cooperation between the international community and Iran and worried by 
the Iran’s attitude, the EU has recently changed its attitude. Consequently, for the 
first time, the EU acted along with the USA and has supported a UN resolution in 
November 2005 on the human rights situation in Iran.55 Furthermore, the EU has 
agreed with the USA to impose economic sanctions on Iran in line with a UN 1737 
resolution56 adopted on 23 December 2006, banning trade with Iran in all items, 
materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to country’s 
enrichment activities.57 Yet, with respect to the option of military action, the High 
Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana told that the EU is not considering military 
action.58 The second UN Security Council Resolution 1747 passed on 24 March 
200759, including a ban of Iranian arms sales and freezing of assets of several Iranian 
revolutionary leaders. In March 2007, the Council of EU emphasized the fact that 
Iran had not complied with the terms of the UN Security Council Resolution 1737 
and reasserted its support for the UN Security Council process. At the same time, the 
Council of EU reaffirmed its continuing support for efforts to find a negotiated long-
term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Solana, the EU High Representative for the 
CFSP, emphasized the commitment of the EU to a negotiated solution to the Iranian 
nuclear dispute.60  
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Here, it would be appropriate to give brief information about the latest 
situation on Iran’s nuclear dispute. On 10 April 2007, Iran was claimed to have made 
a dramatic leap forward in its nuclear programme by enriching uranium ‘on 
industrial scale’.61 Thus, it seems that the two packages passed by the UN Security 
Council so far did not stop Iran from uranium enrichment. As stated above, the IAEA 
will visit Iran to resolve outstanding issues over the country’s nuclear programme in 
February 2008.62 Recently, the five permanent UN Security Council members plus 
Germany have agreed on a draft of the new sanction package, which is likely to be 
approved after the IAEA receives more answers from Iran in February 2008.63 For 
the first time this resolution is going to ban trade of items that can be used for nuclear 
purposes and also require countries to reject entry of any person involved in Iran’s 
nuclear programmes.64 Nonetheless, the NIE report produced an unexpected 
softening in the positions of Russia and China on the new sanctions package. In the 
meantime, though France has been rejecting US efforts to isolate Iran, recently the 
new French President Sarkozy has indicated that Iran’s nuclear programme would be 
the cause of the biggest crisis on the international scene and that they will work 
jointly with the US President Bush to convince Iran to give up its nuclear 
programme.65 His latest declarations have puzzled the attitude of the EU-3 toward 
Iran.  
1.4 THE ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA TOWARD IRAN’S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAMME  
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fading away of communism as 
an ideological threat, the relations between Iran and Russia had experienced a 
significant progress. The underlying reason behind this progress had been 
multidimensional mutual benefits in a number of issues including Iran’s nuclear 
programme. As mentioned above, Iran’s nuclear programme was frozen for a while 
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after 1979. In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran decided to reinitiate the 
programme, but deprived of any Western assistance, looked for new partners to 
develop its nuclear energy technology. In this respect, Russia appeared to be the most 
appropriate partner from the Iranian perspective on three grounds. First of all, Russia 
has been one of the leading countries in nuclear energy technology and was seeking 
to ‘enhance its role as a global supplier of nuclear energy technology.’66 Secondly, 
since Iran was experiencing a deterioration of its relations with the USA, Russia - 
concerned about unipolar world system and hegemony of the USA- might be more 
positive about Tehran’s will of having nuclear energy programme.  Lastly, as Russia 
was not worried about human rights issues, Tehran’s poor human rights record might 
not bother Moscow, and hence Russia could be an ideal ally from Iran’s vantage 
point that would not interfere in Iran’s internal affairs, whereas the USA and the EU 
were emphasizing the issues of democracy and human rights.67 
In August 1992, Tehran and Moscow established a long-term trade and 
cooperation agreement, involving also the Russian assistance in developing Iran’s 
nuclear programme and construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran.  As it is stated; 
Nuclear cooperation would consist of constructing nuclear power plants for 
Iran, cycling nuclear fuel, supplying research reactors, reprocessing spent 
fuel, producing isotopes for use in scientific and medical research and 
training Iranian nuclear scientists at the Moscow Engineering Physics 
Institute.68 
 
Following the 1992 long-term trade and cooperation agreement, in January 1995, a 
contract was signed among Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and a Russian 
company, Zarubezhatomenergostroi to complete construction of the Bushehr69 
nuclear power plant.70  The nuclear plant in Bushehr is separate from Iran’s own 
enrichment facility at Natanz. The Bushehr nuclear plant has started under the Shah 
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of Iran and stopped with the Islamic Revolution until the 1990s.71 Russia agreed to 
complete the project and to supply the enriched uranium needed as fuel, recognizing 
that the Bushehr project including the construction of two nuclear reactors would 
grant a huge amount of money into the Russian economy.  In this respect, assistance 
of Iran’s nuclear programme coincided with Russian economic interests. Also, over 
300 Russian companies have taken part in the Bushehr project, thus activating the 
Russian industries in nuclear research and aerospace that would in return offer a 
serious input into the Russian economy.72 Additionally, this project provided many 
Russians with divergent employment opportunities. 
Besides having economic interests, Russia has had political considerations in 
becoming the leading country in assisting Iran’s nuclear programme. Political 
benefits of Russia can be approached from three points.  First point is that with 
encouraging relationship with Russia, Iran has avoided sponsoring the Islamist 
ideology in the former Soviet Republic, hence enabling Russia to preserve its 
influence over these former Soviet Republics. Accordingly, ‘Tehran has largely 
stayed out of the Islamist struggle in Chechnya,’ ‘keeping quite about Chechnya.’73 
Secondly, since Iran has a considerable weight in the Islamic world, Tehran has 
defended Moscow against ‘hostile resolutions passed by the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference.’74  
Finally, Iran and Russia have acted in harmony sharing common interests in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
Despite above-mentioned benefits determining the Russian approach toward 
Iran in general and its nuclear programme in particular, a major constraint in this 
relationship has been reaction of the Western States, particularly response of the 
USA.  Primarily, support of Iran’s nuclear programme has brought Russia into a 
confrontational position with the USA.  As it is pointed out by Orlov and Vinnikov; 
Since the mid-1990s, Russia had featured in virtually every mention of Iran’s 
nuclear programme.  Indeed, Russia is the only state to have openly 
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cooperated with Iran in the nuclear field and has spent the better part of the 
last decade at the receiving end of fierce US criticism for its efforts. 75 
 
In order to prevent the Russian involvement in Iran’s nuclear programme both the 
Senior Bush and Clinton administrations employed a number of different deterrence 
strategies against Russia including warnings to implement sanctions in the field of 
trade. The Clinton administration exerted pressure on the Yeltsin administration to 
suspend its support for the Bushehr energy reactor. Yet, despite the pressure of 
Washington, throughout the 1990s Moscow resisted Washington’s demands on 
isolating Iran, instead has kept its cooperation with Tehran.  
2002 can be regarded as a decisive moment in the attitude of Russia toward 
Iran’s nuclear programme, because Russia was really astonished to learn about Iran’s 
secret nuclear programme.  Besides Moscow was deeply disappointed with the 
Iranian attitude of not revealing this information to Russia earlier.  In this respect, 
Russia decided to slow down the completion of the Bushehr nuclear energy reactor 
project pointing out technical shortcomings.76 Nevertheless, Russia completed the 
Bushehr nuclear energy project in October 2004 and ‘in February 2005, Moscow and 
Tehran signed an agreement on the return of spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor to 
Russia,’77 which is expected to provide electricity towards the end of the 2008.78 
Russia itself has enriched the uranium for Bushehr. Though the Western countries 
had hoped that Russia would delay the delivery of enriched uranium it appears that 
there is less fear in Russia about Iran’s nuclear intentions.79 Yet, both the Western 
countries and Russia prefer to offer enriched uranium needed as a fuel rather than 
self-enrichment of Iran with the suspicion that Iran’s nuclear programme is intended 
to produce weapons. 
 Regarding the Russian attitude toward Iran’s nuclear programme, two 
contradictory positions are observed together. On the one hand, Russia is Iran’s main 
nuclear partner and accepts its right provided by the NPT, even one might say that 
Russia defends Iran’s nuclear programme in order to maximize Russia’s national 
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interests. On the other hand, Russia reserves hesitations about the intentions of Iran, 
yet prefers negotiations rather than sanctions and military option. Particularly Russia 
has been against implementing sanctions against Iran, since mutual relationship has 
been beneficial for Russia both economically and politically. Thus, Russia might not 
easily agree with an increase in the UN sanctions on Iran in February 2008. Russia 
argues that cooperation with Iran in the nuclear field would make it easier for the 
international community monitoring Iran’s nuclear programme. In this regard, 
together with China, Russia voted for the referral of Iran’s nuclear programme in the 
IAEA Meeting to the UN Security Council that was held on 4 February 2006, on the 
condition that the Council took no action before March.80 Nonetheless, when 
pressures against Iran rose in the aftermath of the February 2006 IAEA vote against 
Iran’s nuclear activities, Russia offered Iran to continue its nuclear programme in the 
Russian territory.81 Iran refused this proposal claiming that it was Iran’s right to 
enrich uranium for peaceful purposes in its own territory, yet looking positively that 
some, but not all of its nuclear fuel can be produced outside Iran.82 To conclude, 
economic and political partnership with Iran is noteworthy from the Russian vantage 
point, hence although Russia has some concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme, 
prefers to remain silent about Iran’s nuclear programme despite growing US 
pressure. 
1.5 THE ATTITUDE OF CHINA TOWARD IRAN’S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAMME 
 
China’s relations with Iran has accelerated in the mid 1990s owing to 
significant increase in its need for energy resources, particularly oil and gas, with 
rapid economic and population growth. As it is pointed out, ‘China surpassed Japan 
to become the second largest international oil consumer after the US.’83 There are 
several factors determining China’s attitude toward Iran’s nuclear programme. First 
factor is China’s wish to secure continuous flow of oil and gas from Iran to China. 
Thus, China’s growing demand for energy security had a large impact in forming its 
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foreign policy toward Iran. From the Chinese perspective, Iran has not only been a 
major energy supplier with ‘the world’s fourth largest reserves of oil and second 
largest reserves of natural gas,’ but also ‘its strategic proximity and increasing 
economic and political impact, given its location between the Caspian Sea and 
Persian Gulf, enhanced its viability.’84 As it is put forward, oil imports from Iran to 
China amounted 2 billion dollars in 2003, representing more than 15 percent of its 
total oil imports, and it is expected that this amount would further increase.85  
Bilateral economic relations among China and Iran are another factor 
determining the Chinese attitude toward Iran and its nuclear programme. China is 
now Iran’s top trade partner and has committed to invest more in Iran’s oil and 
natural gas industry.86 There has been an intensive trade relationship between the two 
states that amounts approximately 10 billion dollars per year. In addition, China has 
made a large amount of investment in Iran. Thus, maintaining economic ties with 
Iran has been a crucial concern for China. As Shen states, ‘Iran is an important 
source of outsourcing for China. Iran is also China’s biggest overseas market for 
large projects and labor export.’87 
On the other hand, maintaining cooperation with the USA has also been 
important for China, as the US is China’s major trade partner. In this respect, it is 
rather difficult for China to keep both sides–Iran and the USA as its partner, since it 
has required a delicate balancing. The dispute between the USA and Iran has 
reflected as a challenge to China because the rapprochement policy of China has 
been annoying the US administration. China neither wishes to risk its trade relations 
with the USA, nor to risk its energy and trade cooperation with Iran. Accordingly, 
there have been several instances in which China had to overview its relations with 
both sides. One of these instances was observed when China’s state-owned company 
the Sinopec-Chinese Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, had decided to make an 
investment in Iran in 2004 for more than 20 million dollars, although the USA 
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declared that it would penalize foreign companies, which invest more than 20 million 
dollars in Iran.88 
What was more challenging is this investment was made at a time tension has 
been dominating Washington-Tehran relations due to US efforts in bringing Iranian 
nuclear issue to the UN Security Council. On October 28, 2004 a ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding’ was signed in Tehran between the Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister 
and the Iranian Oil Minister about an agreement on oil and gas.89 According to this 
agreement, the Chinese government was going to purchase 10 million tons of the 
Iranian oil each year for the next twenty-five years in exchange for allowing Sinopec 
to develop Iran’s Yadavaran oil field ‘giving China a 50 percent interest in the field’s 
estimated 17 billion barrel reserve.’90 In the immediate aftermath of the 
‘Memorandum of Understanding,’ China declared its opposition to bring the issue of 
Iran’s nuclear programme to UN Security Council.91 Consequently, China has 
opposed a draft resolution discussed in the IAEA Meeting that was held on 
September 20, 2005, arguing that a solution has to be found by the IAEA.92  
Nevertheless, to avoid from getting into conflict with the US, China voted for the 
referral of Iran’s nuclear programme in the IAEA Meeting to the UN Security 
Council,93 on 4 February 2006, on the condition that the Council took no action 
before March.94 
Other than Washington’s continuous pressure on Beijing, China’s adherence 
to the NPT was also influential in its voting attitude on the IAEA’s meeting.95 It 
appears that China wishes to be perceived by the international community as a 
reliable state contributing to nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, China wants to 
demonstrate itself as a powerful state contributing to international security, and thus 
remaining passive regarding Iran’s nuclear programme might contradict with its 
global image. On the other hand, since China has also been sensitive about external 
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interference into its internal affairs arising from its human rights record, China is 
more tolerable towards Iran’s concerns on its rights to produce nuclear energy.96 
Therefore, China has respected Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for civilian 
purpose while remaining committed to regulations defined by the IAEA, under its 
commitment to the NPT. 
The analysis of the Chinese attitude toward Iran’s nuclear programme has 
shown that today China faces a serious dilemma with respect to Iran’s nuclear 
programme. On the one hand, China’s growing demand for energy and its economic 
interests makes Iran a strategic partner from the Chinese perspective. In addition, 
China shares concerns of Iran about sovereignty. Hence, China does not want to be a 
part of US-led pressure group for deterring Iran from developing its nuclear capacity 
by means of implementing divergent sanctions, since that might risk its national 
interests. On the other hand, maintaining good relations with Washington also carries 
vital importance for China, as the USA has been China’s key trading partner. Acting 
apart from the USA on Iran’s nuclear programme would challenge China’s relations 
with Washington, which might also damage the Chinese national interest.  Thus, 
until now, China has abstained from using its veto power to remove any US-backed 
measure at the UN Security Council.97 To conclude, similar to Russia, China appears 
to give support to Iran’s nuclear programme and prefers the Iranian nuclear issue to 
be settled by diplomatic efforts and dialogue rather than sanctions. 
1.6 OVERVIEW 
 
The way out from Iran’s nuclear puzzle necessitates common efforts from the 
international community including Iran working for a long-term comprehensive 
solution. This analysis on the attitudes of the USA, the EU/EU-3, Russia and China 
has shown that there is no common comprehensive agreement on the solution toward 
Iran’s nuclear puzzle. The USA sees a mature and serious Iranian nuclear threat to 
come by the year 2010. Official US policy is to leave all the options on the table, as 
well as using diplomatic activity through the EU-3 and the sanctions through the UN 
Security Council. Yet, the USA in particular has problems in convincing the 
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international community that Iran is a grave threat to the Middle East security as well 
as to global security, due to mistakes done in Iraq case. The EU, though 
acknowledges right to the Iranian civil nuclear energy, also considers that Iran is 
pursuing nuclear weapons. The EU has been the main international actor offering 
coercive diplomatic approach to contain the Iranian nuclear programme, which did 
not succeed until today. Yet, this cannot be announced as a complete failure. The EU 
is in a position to push the international community’s attitudes on this issue towards 
more dialogue, even if it cannot impose its will in Tehran.  
The EU effort for ‘critical dialogue’ with Iran in hope to solve the crisis 
through direct negotiations seemed to work well especially when Iran agreed to 
abandon its nuclear programme in the early 2004. Yet, particularly after the election 
of the President Ahmadinejad, Iran’s nuclear programme became more problematic 
which led to a shift on the EU’s policy towards Iran. With a new approach, the EU 
acted with the USA taking the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council in 
order to have an approval for the imposition of ‘stick’ policy through economic 
sanctions against Iran. Yet, though their vantage point appears to become closer with 
the USA, it is not identical. Since the 1990’s the USA has favored ‘an active 
containment’ policy toward Iran, hoping to isolate the Iranian regime, thereby 
causing a ‘regime change’ in Iran. As a part of its ‘active containment’ strategy, the 
USA has not only supported a number of sanctions ranging from political to 
economic, but also has repeated references to military action. Yet, the USA has little 
independent diplomatic or economic leverage over Iran and needs other nations to 
give meaning to any threat of economic lost.  The EU has resisted the US calls to 
intensify the extent of sanctions against Iran, which would go beyond the resolution 
of the UN Security Council. The EU has acted more or less in a united fashion, but 
since it had lasted long, some internal divisions occur, as is already happening today 
with the declarations of the French President Sarkozy.  
Russia and China, on the other hand, do not see Iran as an existential threat. 
The Russian and the Chinese approaches might be a sign of resisting US hegemony 
and control over the Middle East and Central Asia. This might be the reason for their 
strengthened economic, political and diplomatic ties with Iran. Russia supports the 
IAEA’s continued efforts to find more information and wants to take into account the 
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progress achieved through the work of the IAEA and Iran’s readiness to cooperate 
with the IAEA. China also favors diplomatic efforts. So far the adoption of the third 
UN resolution is delayed by the efforts of Russia and China.  
For their part Tehran has been emphasizing the honesty and sincerity of its 
cooperation with the IAEA. President Ahmadinejad has repeatedly told that Iran 
would never abandon purely peaceful programmes. Yet, the nuclear issue has 
become highly politicized in Iran. Though there exists a widely shared national 
consensus and the public believes that Iran has right to enrich uranium for peaceful 
purposes, if not for nuclear weapons, there is a divergence of opinion between the 
hard-liners allied with the Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who support Iran’s search 
to become a nuclear power, and the pragmatists who search for political benefits 
from the West and might accept limits on Iran’s nuclear programme.98 The hardliners 
are closely associated with the Supreme Religious Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei. 
They have enormous influence on national security planning through the command 
of key institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards, the judiciary and the Guardian 
Council.99 The hardliners are not necessarily afraid of sanctions and coercion. In 
contrast to the hardliners, the pragmatists accept certain restrictions on Iran’s nuclear 
programme. The pragmatists do not call for the halt of the Iran’s nuclear programme, 
but work within the guidelines of the NPT. In other words, the pragmatists want to 
sustain Iran’s nuclear programme while maintaining its international ties.100 In the 
last decade, opposition to Ahmadinejad has risen above the traditional split in the 
Iranian politics between pragmatic conservatives and reformists. The opposition has 
evolved around Karroubi, a moderate cleric, and Rafsancani, the former President.101 
The Western diplomats say that the UN sanctions might challenge the hardliners and 
thus the pragmatists might gain more support.102 Yet, in October 2007, the President 
Ahmadinejad had replaced Iran’s pragmatic conservative top nuclear negotiator 
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Larijani by his ally103 though Larijani have been criticizing Ahmadinejad’s more 
provocative positions, but not the nuclear programme itself.104 Anyhow, Larijani was 
in favor of reviving talks with the EU.105 Yet, as the possibility and the need for 
compromise with the EU has become a part of the Iranian discourse, the voices of 
pragmatists might be more assertive. 
To conclude, what emerges from this analysis is that attitudes of the 
international community with respect to Iran’s nuclear puzzle have not been 
monolithic. Yet, after years of having different approaches toward Iran’s nuclear 
programme after the 1979 Revolution, there have been a change to a common 
position among the approaches of the USA and the EU/EU-3 in 2005 – that can be 
called as the ‘Western approach’, vis-a-vis the approaches of Russia and China. 
Russia and China has supported the diplomatic bargaining of the EU-3 rather than 
imposing sanctions advocated by the USA. Considering the overlapping issues of 
concern, this article put forward an optimistic scenario that might lead to successful 
solution on Iran’s nuclear puzzle based on the EU’s method of diplomacy. 
Nevertheless, no real solution is expected in the short term, but there can be an 
opportunity under a new American administration along with a new government in 
Iran after 2009, since the new US President will be elected in November 2008, and 
the new Iranian President will be elected in mid-2009. It is rather difficult to keep 
international consensus –above all in the Security Council- over how to address the 
Iran’s nuclear puzzle, particularly on escalating sanctions, while China and Russia 
have hesitations. So far the USA has failed to coerce Iran to bargain, and a brief 
window of rapprochement with Iran had closed. Today, it seems that there is no 
possibility of direct talks with Iran under the Bush administration. Recent US search 
for economic pressure on Iran is strongly supported by Britain and France, while 
Russia, China and Germany are opposing moves outside the UN Security Council. 
As discussion of relations with the USA has become more specific in Iran in terms of 
open calls for direct relations with the USA and as already some contact has begun 
with the discussion on issues related to Iraq, there is more reason to be optimistic. 
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After the US elections, there might be reconsideration on the question of how to deal 
with Iran’s nuclear puzzle. The optimistic scenario may be the next US   
administration’s opt for staying on the diplomatic track and the reestablishment of 
the EU’s locomotive role in designing a deal with Iran’s nuclear puzzle. 
 CHAPTER TWO 
IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: DOMESTIC DEBATES 
 
2.1 GENERAL ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR MOTIVES 
 
Iran is a country with large oil and natural gas reserves and is increasingly 
perceived as the main component of stability in the Gulf region.  Is Iran in need of 
alternative energy resources such as nuclear energy? Why does Iran insist upon 
continuing with its nuclear programme?  There are mainly five motives behind Iran’s 
nuclear programme.  The first motive is about Iran’s pursuit of energy security and 
self-sufficiency through energy diversification.   It is predicted by the analysts that 
the oil and gas reserves of Iran will be depleted in 20-50 years time since these 
resources are finite.106  Besides, Iran has a rapid population growth that leads to an 
increase in domestic oil consumption.  Given rapid population growth along with 
growing energy consumption, Iran argues that it has to diversify its energy resources 
and acquiring nuclear technology is claimed to provide Iran with an alternative 
energy supply.  In this regard, it is also pointed out that “the nuclear issue is not just 
a question of energy but of science and technology and self sufficiency and as such 
an issue of great practical and symbolic significance” for Iran.107  Thus, avoiding 
dependency on outside suppliers for its energy need is has been a motivating factor 
behind Iran’s nuclear research programme.  As Chubin puts forward, “the nuclear 
programme implies self sufficiency in all aspects of using the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy from extraction through enrichment”.108  It is as well argued that nuclear 
technology would provide Iran with more freedom of action securing future 
generations with substantial energy supply.109 
The second motive behind Iran’s nuclear programme is about economic 
considerations.  Iranian economy has been facing severe problems due to a number 
of factors.  Firstly, as it has already been mentioned despite the fact that Iran is the 
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second largest oil producer in the OPEC, Iran imports nearly 40% of its gasoline 
from other countries mainly from the Gulf States to meet its domestic demand.110  
Gasoline imports constitutes a significant handicap for Iranian economy as it 
“imports more than a third of its annual consumption of over 64.5 million liters from 
a variety of foreign sources at an estimated cost of more than  $3 billion annually.”111  
Secondly, Iranian regime has failed to reinvest in its industry over the last 20 
years.112  Lastly, Iranian economy has long been in short of foreign direct 
investment.113  Proceeding with nuclear technology is believed to offer a cure to 
economic problems predominating Iranian society. 
The third motive behind Iran’s nuclear programme concerns the advantages 
and opportunities presented by NPT to its signatory members regarding their rights 
and responsibilities.   Being a signatory member of NPT provided Iran with an 
opportunity to acquire nuclear technology and know-how for peaceful purposes in 
line with the subarticles of article IV of the NPT.114  The subarticles of article IV of 
the NPT states:  
 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted  as affecting the  inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to  develop research, production and  use of nuclear  energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination. 
2. All the  parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, 
the  fullest possible exchange  of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the  peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  Parties to the Treaty in a position 
to do so shall also  co-operate  in contributing alone  or together  with   other States or 
international  organizations to   the  further  development of the applications of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States 
Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the 
world.115 
 
Iran’s nuclear programme is fourthly motivated by the matters of prestige and status 
that are believed to be gained by means of becoming a nuclear power.  Possession of 
nuclear technology is expected to increase Iran’s influence both regionally and 
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internationally. As Chubin highlight technology and power are equated, and thus 
“nuclear power is said to give Iran entry into an exclusive club”.116  Likewise, the 
possession of nuclear technology is seen as an indicator of modernization which in 
return would heighten Iranian national prestige and would reinforce its weight in the 
region. Amuzegar states:  “Possession of an atomic bomb would give the theocratic 
oligarchy entry into the prestigious nuclear club, which, like all exclusive clubs 
bestows on members a coveted status far beyond its club’s privileges and 
amenities”.117 
The fifth motive behind Iran’s nuclear programme is about domestic politics 
and this motive has two components.  One of them is that oil revenues along with 
natural gas revenues form the largest income of Iranian economy and this rent is the 
core means of legitimizing the regime. Oil rent has given the Iranian ruling regime 
the opportunity to provide its citizens with a wide range of services including free 
education, health care and housing. This has contributed not only to the ability of the 
ruling regime to purchase the consent of its citizens about political decisions but also 
to the weakening of any potential opposition groups.   With the reduction in oil 
revenues, the Iranian ruling regime would become more accountable to its citizens, 
since it would be lacking enough economic means either to silence the opposition or 
to pacify any public criticism.  That’s why Iranian regime has sought for nuclear 
technology that would remove the burden of domestic energy consumption through 
allowing the Iranian regime with much oil income.   Secondly, the nuclear issue has 
become a common point around which all Iranians converged.  As Chubin 
demonstrates, “polls consistently show some 80 percent of the population supporting 
Iran’s access to nuclear technology as a right that reflects and contributes to Iran’s 
advanced scientific status”.118  In this respect, Iranian regime frequently uses this 
compromise both to silence its opponents and to quote national unity in their 
international negotiations.   
 The final motive behind Iran’s nuclear program is about security 
considerations.  Iran is located in an unstable, insecure region surrounded by nuclear 
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powers such as Israel and Pakistan.  In addition, Iranian sense of threat has 
accelerated “following the American military presence in Afghanistan, on Iran’s 
eastern border, and the US invasion of Iraq, on its western border”.119  Exposed to 
threat perception from the USA and the Israel, Iran assumed that a nuclear capability 
would be a significant deterrent against external threats and a counterbalance to 
Israeli military power in the region.  Accordingly, Iranian regime has argued that 
nuclear capability would help Iran to be taken seriously as a dominant regional 
actor.120  Moreover Iranian regime has discovered that possession of nuclear 
technology would increase Iranian bargaining power vis-à-vis international 
community as the examples of North Korea, Pakistan and India have demonstrated.   
As Amuzegar indicates with the possession nuclear technology Iranian leadership 
believed that Iran can more easily ignore international pressure and would enjoy 
greater respect by the USA as it worked in the case of North Korea.121  As it is 
pointed out; 
 
 In relation   to    the   examples  of  North Korea, Pakistan   and India, it   is  said  that these   
 Countries   have   become  immune  from  US  aggression thanks  to  their  nuclear-weapons  
 capabilities,  which    have  acted    as   a   deterrent   and  established   a  counterbalancing  
 mechanism to potential future American threats.  Indeed, it is apparent to the proponents of  
 this view that India   and Pakistan   have even been rewarded for their nuclear misdeeds by  
 the USA.122 
 
 
2.2 COMPETING APPROACHES VIA POLITICAL FACTIONS 
 
Iran’s political system has a complex administrative structure which is 
different from other Middle Eastern states.  In Iran, the political administrative 
structure consists of both elected and unelected set of individuals and institutions.  
Elected political administrative institutions include the president, the cabinet, the 
parliament (Iranian Majlis) and the assembly of experts whereas unelected political 
administrative institutions include the supreme leader (Velayet-e Faqih / Rule of the 
Jurisprudent), armed forces, the head of judiciary, the expediency council and the 
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guardian council.  On the one hand, Islamic Republic empowers the Iranian 
population to elect their president, representatives of the parliament and 
representatives of the municipal councils whereas on the other unelected institutions 
are empowered with the ultimate authority over national affairs without any electoral 
process.123  As Bahgat points out, “True, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei 
had the final word on all important issues, but it is also true that the system was 
designed to ensure a level of checks and balances between different institutions.”124 
It would be appropriate to speak of four divergent factions within the Iranian 
political system, which are radical conservatives (hardliners), mainstream 
conservatives (moderates), pragmatists and reformists.  Each of these factions has its 
own agenda, priorities and positions with respect to a number of domestic and 
foreign policy issues.   According to Mehran Kamrava, a Middle East specialist, 
among many policy issues national security policies deserve special attention and of 
the various national security policies, nuclear program attracts attention.125  Although 
these positions converge on the significance of a nuclear programme, they are 
divided over both about the scope of this programme and how to handle the response 
of the international community.  To put it differently all “sides agree that Iran must 
have access to nuclear technology, what they disagree over is the means to achieving 
this end or, more accurately, the price they are willing to pay in order to accomplish 
the same goal”.126 
As it is put forward by Chubin, the nuclear issue influences politics to a large 
extent as political factions have sought to use this issue politically.127  While holding 
office, each of these political factions expressed their approval for possessing nuclear 
technology and linked it directly to Iran’s national interest particularly emphasizing 
the importance of generating nuclear energy.  What differentiated these factions is 
that whereas the reformists and the pragmatists are more careful in proceeding with 
this technology and are willing to negotiate with the international community, the 
conservatives particularly the hardliners are impatient to achieve this technology 
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disregarding the attitude of the international community almost leaving no room for 
dialogue.128 
Likewise, the conservatives are more willing to “violate Iran’s treaty 
commitments and imperil important regional relationships for the sake of acquiring 
nuclear arms,” when compared with either pragmatists or reformists.129  The radical 
conservatives (hardliners) are more suspicious about the West in general and the 
USA in particular, in comparison with other three factions.  As a result, unlike 
reformists or pragmatists, hardliners support a revolutionary foreign policy. More 
than other three factions, the pragmatist faction focuses on the critical 
interrelationship among the nuclear confrontation with the West and the needs of 
Iran’s economy, and concentrates on the impact of nuclear programme on Iranian 
economy.130 
The eventual outcome of Iran’s nuclear programme depends on which faction 
dominates the political system in Iran.  Since the election of Ahmedinejad as the 
president in the 2005 presidential elections, hardliners have been more influential in 
determining the developments with respect to nuclear programme and Iranian foreign 
policy.  Some hardliners have even argued in favor of leaving the NPT to eliminate 
any barriers to seeking nuclear weapons.131  The buffer before the implementation of 
hardliners’ radical policies lies in the moderating role undertaken by mainstream 
conservatives such as the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei.  Currently, both the 
elected and unelected political administrative institutions are under the control of 
conservatives.  However, it would be appropriate to differentiate among the radical 
conservatives and the mainstream conservatives as it seems likely that the political 
struggle mainly among these factions would determine the fate of the Iranian nuclear 
puzzle.  In the proceeding part, four competing approaches toward Iranian nuclear 
program will be analyzed in detail within the factional context. 
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2.2.1 Conservatives 
 
Iran’s conservative faction is divided into two groups as radical conservatives 
broadly known as hardliners and mainstream conservatives broadly known as 
moderates.  Whereas conservatives differ from either pragmatists or reformists both 
in domestic and foreign policy issue, what differentiates hardliners from moderates is 
their radical attitude in foreign policy issues.  Hardliners have strongly supported 
anti-Western foreign policy vision. In this respect, while both groups of 
conservatives seemed determined to accomplish nuclear program, they “differ on 
means or the price to be paid to achieve this”.132  Here, while moderates care about 
the normalization of external relations, hardliners are not bothered about it at all.   
Ehteshami and Zweiri point out that Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s133 presidential 
victory reveals the transformation of the political struggle in Iran from one between 
the conservatives and other factions to one within the conservative faction itself.134  
Recent parliamentary elections135 which took place on 14 March 2008 clearly 
demonstrated the intense competition for political power between these two factions.  
In line with expectations, conservative candidates rather than pragmatists, reformists 
or a combination of both dominated the Iranian Majlis.  Among the conservatives, 
mainstream conservatives gained more seats that the radical conservatives.  This was 
largely due to criticisms raised by mainstream conservatives against radical 
conservatives arising from the three rounds of sanctions imposed on Iran by the UN 
over its nuclear programme.136  Moderate conservative winners of the parliamentary 
elections include the former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, who has been an 
outstanding opponent of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.137  The result of the 
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recent parliamentary elections would be a signal of the intensifying competition 
among the moderates and hardliners for the forthcoming 2009 presidential elections. 
 
2.2.1.1 Radical Conservatives (Hardliners) 
 
With the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in August 2005, 
political power of the hardliners in the Iranian political system has consolidated.   In 
reality, victory of President Ahmedinejad owed largely to his deployment of a 
populist rhetoric (Ahmedinejad mainly emphasized social justice, independence, and 
export of the revolution in his election campaign) promising to serve particularly to 
those Iranians, who had not been taken care of by previous administrations and who 
constituted the majority of the Iranian population. Other than the defeat of the 
reformists, Ahmedinejad’s presidency implied “the rise of a new political elite of 
‘neoconservatives’ with a new political discourse and a new agenda.”138   
In the immediate aftermath of the Ahmadinejad’s taking office, deterioration 
of relations with the EU/EU3 took place with respect to nuclear issue.  Just one year 
before, Iran and the EU/EU3 signed the Paris agreement (November 2004) which 
encouraged the suspension of Iranian nuclear programme in exchange for intensified 
economic relations between the EU ad Iran.  Soon after, Ahmedinejad came to 
power, he appointed new officials from hardliner faction for Iran’s negotiating team 
which was established to deal with external concerns about Iranian nuclear 
programme.  This change has surely influenced Iran’s relations with the West in a 
negative way especially when the nuclear issue has been in focus.  President 
Ahmadinejad has refused to enter into any new talks with the EU/EU3 about Iran’s 
nuclear programme.139  Moreover, the new administration restarted its uranium 
enrichment programme which has been suspended for only nine months, breaking 
negotiations with the EU/EU3.140  On this issue, Kamrava states: 
 
 In June  2005, soon  after Ahmedinejad’s election, Iran  served  notice of  its intention to                 
 resume the enrichment activities it  had  suspended during  the  negotiations, rejected an  
 incentives package proposed by the  EU, resumed enrichment  the following August, and  
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 adopted  a more belligerent  posture  toward the EU, the IAEA and the US, which by now     
 had become  directly  involved  in  the  matter.  Since  then, it has shrugged off threats of  
 progressively stronger UN sanctions or even US military strikes or both. 141 
 
 
It would be appropriate to mention about three characteristics of hardliners’ 
policies with respect to Iranian nuclear programme.  First of all, hardliners follow 
policies that are anti-Western in their nature and nuclear issue has not been an 
exception.  They have justified their anti-Western stance, both pointing out the 
corruptness of the Western culture along with its colonial legacy, and underlying the 
significance of self-sufficiency.  Hardliners have made frequent references to 
importance of self-sufficiency particularly in the scientific and technological fields to 
consolidate Iranian position in the international system.  According to hardliners, the 
major obstacle to Iranian scientific and technological advances is the West that “is 
determined to keep Iran technologically subordinate,” and they further claimed that 
EU and the IAEA are both ‘bullies’ to impede Iran’s progress.142  
 In this regard, the hardliners view the 1979 Islamic Revolution more as anti-
Western, anti-imperialist and anti-US uprising rather than an anti-monarchical one.  
Since hardliners are the most passionate advocates and guardians of the Islamic 
revolution, they have established a positive correlation among protecting Islamic 
Republic’s national interests with confronting the West.  As the chief of the 
judiciary, Ayatollah Mahmood Hashemi Shahroudi, stated in 2001, “Our national 
interests lie with antagonizing the Great Satan.  We condemn any cowardly stance 
toward America and any word on compromise with the Great Satan.”143  In line with 
Shahroudi’s statement, Ahemedinejad has continuously accused Western countries of 
attempting to prevent Iran from developing peaceful nuclear technology.  He 
declared that Iran would never give up developing this technology denying Western 
claims that his regime had never pursued any nuclear weapons.144  Ahmadinejad 
even threatened to use the oil card blocking regular supply of oil therefore causing a 
radical increase at oil prices.  He said in one of his speeches dated back to December 
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2005: “If Iran’s nuclear case is referred to the Security Council of the UN, then the 
response of this country will be to use different ways to stop selling oil.”145 
In a recent address, he charged UN Security Council as being a tool in 
Western hands to realize Western interests.  He said that 2008 sanctions resolution 
against Iran’s civilian nuclear activities would further “downgrade the UN’s 
standing”.146  According to Ahmadinejad the Security Council made its anti-Iran 
decisions based on false information and thus its credibility had a major blow.147  
Similar to the address of Ahmedinejad, another hardliner, Majlis Speaker Gholam-
Ali Haddad-Adel, criticized the UN Security Council’s move to intensify sanctions 
against Iran as “illogical, illegal, and absolutely political.”148 
Another characteristic of hardliners’ policies with respect to Iran’s nuclear 
programme is that they use ‘conflict’ as a means to achieve their goals.  Chubin 
points out that hardliners view the world as a “Hobbesian one of unremitting 
struggle, where predatory powers lurk to dictate and dominate and where the only 
currency is military power.”149  Hardliners’ have not seemed to be bothered by any 
conflict or confrontation with the foreign powers.  Even, they have not avoided 
pouring gasoline to burning fire.  This attitude has two key explanations.  Firstly, 
hardliners believe that negotiations and compromises would only contribute to 
preserving the status quo in foreign relations.  Thus, they advocate conflict and 
contention to extend the influence of the regime beyond its borders.  As it is 
mentioned, “negotiations, in this mind-set, reflect and ratify the balance of power but 
add nothing to it.150  Secondly, hardliners are well aware that existence of a foreign 
threat has a unifying and mobilizing impact on the people.  Thus, keeping the idea of 
external challenge alive through conspiracies, hardliners have been able “to divert 
attention from their inadequate domestic record”.151  To put it differently, hardliners 
have made use of conflict and confrontation to cover the shortcomings of their 
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policies both in the political and socio-economic fields.  As Takeyh has also pointed 
out, the primary beneficiary of US hostility and sanctions policy have been the 
radical conservatives since “as they have long required external demons and isolation 
from the international community as a means justifying their monopoly of political 
power”.152 
Lastly, unlike other political factions hardliners have believed that not only 
access to peaceful nuclear technology but also access to military nuclear technology 
are required for Iran’s further development.  They have emphasized the significance 
of hard power to preserve the security and prestige of the Islamic Republic believing 
that possessing nuclear capability would make Iran immune from any external 
interference into its domestic affairs such as human rights.  Hardliners have also been 
less enthusiastic about rejecting the claims that Iran was secretly pursuing nuclear 
weapon technology.  On this issue, Chubin and Litwak suggest that the rationale for 
the nuclear weapons program rests in the worldview of the hard-liners, who see the 
programme as the ultimate guarantor of Iran’s influence and security and, not 
incidentally, their own political power.”153  In fact, since Ahmedinejad’s presidency, 
militarization of Iranian politics has increased.154    According to Ehteshami and 
Zweiri, for the first time in over a generation, political establishment in Iran has had 
more militaristic face than ever.155  This has as well contributed to the intensification 
of alarm bells in the West. 
Overall, the current political setting in Iran is almost dominated by hardliners 
who support hawkish national security policies in the Supreme National Security 
Council (SNSC).156  Thus, the acquisition of nuclear technology would also likely to 
result in the acquisition of nuclear weapons under the rule of hardliners meeting 
concerns of the international community.  Access to nuclear weapons would enhance 
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the militarization of the Iran’s regime enhancing the very same populist forces in the 
military-security apparatus.157 
 
2.2.1.2 Mainstream Conservatives (Moderates) 
  
Despite the fact that the radical and the mainstream conservatives share many 
things in common in general and with respect to Iranian nuclear programme in 
particular, there are several visional differences among these two factions.  First of 
all, when the nuclear issue is in focus, whereas mainstream conservatives care about 
potential costs such as isolation and sanctions, radical conservatives usually remain 
to be indifferent to potential costs.  Secondly, notwithstanding the fact that 
conservatives in general are less enthusiastic about developing relations with the 
West when compared with either pragmatists or reformists, mainstreams 
conservatives at least favor the normalization of relations with the West, whereas 
“their hardliner counterparts welcome the opportunity to purify the regime and 
society by limiting contamination from the outside and asserting the revolution’s 
values of self-reliance and authenticity.”158  Statements by President Ahmedinejad 
have demonstrated the indifference and disrespect of radical conservatives for 
international community. 
Lastly, even though both the radical and the traditional conservatives 
converge on the desire to enhance Iran’s power and influence by means of nuclear 
technology they differ on their perceptions of Iran and the external world.  Whereas 
mainstream conservatives have a realistic perception of Iran and the external world, 
radical conservatives have on the one hand overestimated Iran’s power and centrality 
in the international system, while one the other hand  misjudging the external world, 
they have an exaggerated perception of the antagonism and hostility the West felt 
against Iran.159 
With the election of Ahmedinejad as the president, the mainstream 
conservatives are expected to loose some of their control in the political system.  
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However, this assumption has not realized at all since Supreme Leadership position 
is occupied by a mainstream conservative, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.   Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been influential in curbing the extremism in 
hardliner’ policies to restore some political equilibrium in the Iranian political 
system.160 
In fact, mainstream conservatives are not happy with the way the nuclear 
issue is handled by president Ahmedinejad and other radical conservatives.  Thus, 
mainstream conservatives have been in a position to check the policies implemented 
by radical conservatives.161  Other than the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei, Ali Larijani162 is also an outstanding figure belonging to mainstream 
conservative faction.  Ali Larijani and Supreme Leader Khamenei representing the 
mainstream conservative faction occupy a middle position lie in between radical 
conservatives and the pragmatists.  This position is mostly apparent in Khamenei’s 
acts and attitudes.  As Pollack and Takeyh indicate that on the one hand Khamenei 
shares the “hardliners’ revolutionary convictions and their confrontational impulses,” 
whereas on the other as the head of state, he is aware of his duty to “safeguard Iran’s 
national interests and temper ideology with statecraft”.163  For this reason, Khamenei 
has followed a delicate policy trying to balance the hardliners and the pragmatists, 
preventing either of them to gain excessive power.  Pollack mentions: 
 
 Khamenei  understands  the  importance  both  of  not  allowing Iran’s economy  to collapse  
 (because of the potential for this to cause widespread popular unrest) and not alienating the  
 radical hardliners  who  ultimately  are key to his hold on power.  As a result, from 1990 till  
 2002, Khamenei pursued a middle path, never curbing Iranian nuclear and terrorist activity    
 enough  to satisfy the Americans, but keeping things in check enough to allow the European  
 and Japanese governments (who were  more willing to turn a blind eye to Iranian misdeeds  
 at that time) to continue to trade and invest in Iran.164 
 
 
Negotiations for nuclear dispute were mostly under the control of mainstream 
conservatives during the 2003-2005 period and they preferred to act within the limits 
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of NPT.  They cared about the relations with the international community and 
suspension of enrichment programme as a result of Paris agreement signed between 
Iran and the EU/EU3 was a clear indication that moderates choose cooperation in 
their relations with the external world.   In addition, their awareness of the potential 
costs of a disruption of relations with the international community forced the 
moderates to accept the Additional Protocol of the NPT.  As Pollack and Takeyh 
point out despite pressures by the radical conservatives for discarding the NPT, 
Supreme leader Khamenei agreed that Tehran would sign the NPT’s Additional 
Protocol165 that was followed by Iranian consent for suspending its uranium 
enrichment activities.166  It was also Khamenei, who charged Ali Larijani for 
supervising the negotiations on the nuclear dispute worrying about any mishandling 
about the nuclear issue by Ahmedinejad administration.  Khamenei also charged 
Kamal Kharrazi (he was the former foreign affairs minister during Khatami 
Administation), a reformist to supervise foreign affairs.   
Overall, whereas mainstream conservatives resembled the radical 
conservatives in believing that nuclear technology would enhance Iranian power and 
prestige in the international system, mainstream conservatives have a moderate 
stance in its relations with the international community when compared with 
aggressive hardliners.  Moderated have more things in common with the pragmatists 
when the national interest and economic issues are in focus.  To preserve national 
interests or economic interests moderates are inclined to engagement, 
accommodation and compromise.   Criticisms against Ahmadinejad administration 
have not been made only by pragmatists and reformists but also by traditional 
conservatives.  Particularly, provocative speeches by Ahmedinejad about the nuclear 
dispute and the approval of third set of sanctions by the UN Security Council in 
December 2007 led to sharp criticism against Ahmedinejad for inflaming the nuclear 
by traditional conservatives.167 
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2.2.2 Pragmatists 
 
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani168 representing the pragmatist faction, is an 
influential figure in Iranian political system.  During his presidency (1989 to 1997) 
Rafsanjani followed a pragmatic policy concentrating externally on the development 
of trade relations with other countries and internally seeking to shift Iran’s economy 
from a state-controlled one to a more market-based one.  He also encouraged a 
rapprochement with the West.  Rafsanjani and the pragmatists gathered around him 
have long prioritized rebuilding Iran’s economy recognizing that this required 
“vastly improved relations with the West in order to encourage greater trade and 
investment in Iran”.169  Pragmatists have made alliances with the traditional 
conservatives and reformists whenever their interests with that of either of these 
groups converged.170 
On the nuclear issue, pragmatists have stood for the nuclear programme as 
long as it did not have a negative impact on Iran’s trade relations and its economy.  
Pragmatists have frequently implied that in order to improve relations with the West 
which are critical to Iran’s economic interests, they would even abandon the nuclear 
programme.171  With respect to the nuclear issue, Rafsanjani stated, “Iran is not 
looking for acts of adventurism.”172  Rafsanjani has also repeatedly emphasized that 
Iran was ready to negotiate with the international community about its nuclear 
programme.173   
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According to pragmatists given the fact that the US has been highly critical 
and suspicious of Iran’s nuclear programme, any provoking act of Iran would lead 
other states to adopt US’ penalizing stance, thus leading to Iran’s further isolation.  
In this regard, prior to referral of Iran to the UN Security Council owing to 
Ahmedinejad administration’s aggressive tactics and rhetoric on the issue, Rafsanjani 
criticized Ahmedinejad administration’s provocative strategies and argued in favor of 
intense diplomacy.174  He said, “Our main task is to prove that we are not the sort of 
people to utilize nuclear weapons” and to prove to Iran’s opponents that “Iran will 
not use the technology for military purposes.”175  Likewise, in an interview in 2002, 
Ali Shamkhani, former Iranian Minister of Defense from the pragmatic faction 
stated, “existence of nuclear weapons will turn us [Iran] into a threat to others that 
could be exploited in a dangerous way to harm our relations with the countries of the 
region.”176 
Overall, pragmatists have prioritized economic efficiency and on the nuclear 
issue they are aware that the imposition of multilateral sanctions would put Iranian 
economy under constraint.  For pragmatists, harmonious relations with foreign states 
are significant for developing mutual trade relations and encouraging the flow of 
foreign investment to Iran contributing the welfare of Iranian economy.   Rafsanjani 
warned that “If there are domestic and foreign conflicts, foreign capital will not flow 
into the count…such conflicts will lead to the flight of capital from this country.”177  
In relation to the nuclear issue, pragmatists have not approved hardliners’ aggressive 
attitude which have invited further sanctions by the international community.  To 
sum up, pragmatists have opposed each and every act which have raised difficulties 
for Iran’s greater integration into the global economy.   
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2.2.3 Reformists 
 
With the election of Ahmedinejad as the President in 2005 presidential 
elections, reformists have lost control in almost all important political institutions.  
The reformists have gathered around Muhammad Reza Khatami,178 who helped to 
moderate Iran’s foreign policy in the late 1990s until the collapse of this approach 
with the strengthening of hardliner faction starting from early 2000s which is led by 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.179  In relation to domestic politics, reformists have strongly 
advocated liberal principles of freedom of expression, tolerance and civil society.180  
Like pragmatists they have also favored the functioning of a free market and Iran’s 
greater integration into the global economy.  In relation to foreign affairs have 
reformists have encouraged constructive diplomatic relations with other countries.   
Particularly during mid-1990s, Khatami intensely “endorsed a foreign policy of 
engagement and integration in the global society”.181  In this regard, Khatemi 
opposed to Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”182 thesis, instead arguing 
for a “Dialogue Among Civilizations.”183   
Despite higher intentions of the reformists, it would not be unfair to tell that 
during the two terms they occupied key governmental positions, they did not succeed 
in political liberalizing.  This was probably due to the fact that unelected 
administrative positions were occupied by mainstream conservatives who were 
against change.  This led to a disappointment among many Iranians who believed 
that reformists would realize political and socio-economic reforms in line with their 
promises.  
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For reformists nuclear programme was not an issue of high priority.  Instead 
they paid much more attention to issues of political and socio-economic reforms.  
They also emphasized establishing good relations with the liberal West.  Indeed as 
Pollack points out “during the Khatami Administration, many leading Iranian 
reformists privately assured the USA that Mr. Khatami would be willing to give up 
the nuclear program altogether as part of a general rapprochement.”184  In fact, 
during Khatami’s administration was successful in reducing Iran’s global economic 
isolation and attracting a growing number of foreign investors.185 
According to Chubin, the reformists generally view the nuclear programme as 
one among other several technologies and in relation to the nuclear issue they are not 
willing it to lead to “Iran’s estrangement from the international community and hurt 
relations with neighbors”.186  When the reformists were in power, they underlined the 
significance of dialogue and cooperation in solving the nuclear dispute with the 
international community.  As Kamrava indicates, 
 
 Keen to lower tensions and to show the country’s willingness to cooperate with the EU  and  
 IAEA, when  the  reformists were  in  power, they  were  willing to  suspend  enrichment  for    
 the  life of the negotiations and were eager to come up with a win-win compromise whereby  
 Iran would continues its nuclear activities under  a presumably toughened  IAEA inspection  
  regime.187 
 
Reformists have insisted on that Iran’s national interests would be preserved 
through its adhering to the broad confines of the international nonproliferation 
regimes.  Ali Reza Aghazadeh, an outstanding Khatami advisor, said, “Peace and 
stability cannot be achieved by means of nuclear weapons.”188  Another reformist, 
Mustafa Moin189 clearly emphasized that “if seeking enrichment poisoned relations 
with the international community, Iran should forgo it”.190 
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2.3 PUBLIC OPINION: VOICE OF THE IRANIAN STREET 
 
In relation to nuclear issue, public opinion in Iran is not monolithic in contrast 
to what the Iranian government constantly tries to demonstrate.  It is true that some 
conscious Iranians support the nuclear programme due to a number of motivations 
such as the need for alternative energy resources as oil resources will be depleted, 
security concerns and Western approval for nuclear programmes of several countries 
including Israel, India and Pakistan.  Some others view the right to develop nuclear 
power as a matter of national pride since they “perceive their nation as a great 
civilization that has been deprived of its rightful status as a regional superpower by 
foreign intervention, including the Russian, British, and American…Developing an 
indigenous nuclear capability would go a long a way in restoring a sense of pride and 
respect.”191  The remaining Iranians do not have any idea about either what exactly 
the nuclear programme is about or what would its implications be on their daily lives.  
As Atrianfar, Rafsanjani’s advisor, said, “People have been hearing these things 
about having the right to have or to possess this [nuclear] capability. And, naturally, 
if you ask an Iranian whether [they] want this right or not, they would say they do 
want it.  But if you ask, though, ‘What is nuclear energy?’ they might not be able to 
tell you what it is.”192  There is also uncertainty in the Iranian street particularly 
about how to handle the nuclear dispute given the strong suspicion prevailing within 
the international community.  
In fact, the nuclear programme is not a crucial issue for an average Iranian.  
Iranian street cares more about the price of bread or other major goods and the 
growing unemployment rather than the fate of uranium enrichment activities.  To put 
it differently, economic welfare is the priority of an average Iranian and the nuclear 
issue is a subject of discussion only in the socio-economically satisfied segments of 
the Iranian society.  As Sadjadpour points out “per capita income in today’s Iran is 
                                               
191
 Bahgat, p. 322. 
192
 Muhammad Atrianfar, interview by Margaret Warner, PBS NewsHour, 06.09.2006, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec06/iran_09-06.html quoted in Karim 
Sadjadpour, “How Relevant Is the Iranian Street?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol.30, No.1, 2006-
07, pp. 155-156. 
 50 
roughly one-half what it was shortly before the shah’s downfall”.193  In the 
immediate aftermath of Ahmedinejad’s coming to power, Iranian economy faced a 
significant challenge.  Foreign investors fled to neighboring states and the stock 
market experienced a sharp decline due to foreign investors’ lack of confidence in 
Ahmedinejad administration’s economic policies and the appointment of ministers 
with little known management experience.194  In fact, economic expectations of the 
people from Ahmedinejad’s administration had already risen owing to effective 
populist electoral campaign of Ahmedinejad promising to deliver greater amount of 
oil revenues to them prior to president.  Yet, Ahmedinejad was soon to discover the 
difficulty of delivering on his economic promises of bringing the benefits of oil 
revenues to the Iranian people.195 
 Iranian economy has long been experiencing a set of macroeconomic problem 
such as high inflation, unemployment, and income inequality.196  It is pointed out 
that inflation rate has reached double digits accompanying the living of one out of 
every four Iranians below the poverty line.197  Other than economic problems, many 
Iranians particularly the younger generation, have become tired of divergent 
restrictions on individual liberties imposed by the Ahmedinejad administration.  
According to Jafarzadeh, this socio-economic burden over the shoulders’ of the 
Iranians has turned the domestic situation into a “time bomb that could explode any 
day”.198    It is true that popular discontent has increased to a large extent during the 
Ahmedinejad era.  It was registered that roughly 4,000 antigovernment 
demonstrations took place in Iran between March 2005 and March 2006, an average 
of more than 330 protests every month.199 
Aware of the domestic crisis, Ahmadinejad administration has tried to divert 
the attention of the Iranians from the realities by overemphasizing Iran’s nuclear 
rights and Western powers’ attempts to deprive Iran of those rights, thereby 
appealing to Iranians’ sense of nationalism.  Through public speeches Ahmedinejad 
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has frequently accused Western powers of trying to prevent Iran from enriching 
uranium in order “to keep it backward and dependent on the West”.200  During 
international negotiations Iranian leaders have often made references to popular polls 
revealing that the clear majority of the Iranian population has supported the nuclear 
programme.  It is ironic that although the current Iranian regime has constantly 
disregarded and has even repressed public opinion, when the nuclear programme has 
been in focus, they have use Iranian street as a bargaining tool in their foreign 
relations.201  The polls referred by the Ahmedinejad administration have pointed out 
that 80 percent of the population is supporting Iran’s access to nuclear technology.202 
Like each and every citizen, Iranians have been in favor of an increase in their 
country’s status, respect and a broader regional role and they have viewed access to 
advanced technology as desirable. However, it would be appropriate to maintain 
nationalistic feelings of the Iranian people have been provoked by the regime in 
relation to the nuclear issue.  It is true that the polls conducted have found strong 
public support for the country’s nuclear programme.203   However, issues of whether 
these polls are either scientific or objective are debatable.  Christopher de Bellaigue, 
the correspondent for the Economist in Tehran puts forward that these polls were 
conducted mostly by organs close to Iran’s conservative establishment and in 
addition to the obvious bias prevailing in these polls, they are inherently flawed as 
the questions in these polls imply that the nuclear programme is a risk-free enterprise 
offering those surveyed no alternative.204  It is also mentioned that since the Iranian 
government has intimately controlled research on this topic by Iranian media, 
analysts and journalists have had “to cite government-sponsored surveys that indicate 
that the majority of the Iranian public supports the country’s nuclear program” in the 
absence any reliable empirical data.205  In his article in Financial Times, Former 
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ senior official Abbas Maleki writes; 
 
 Reports suggest that Tehran’s official joy over the nuclear breakthrough is shared by a    
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 large segment of Iranian society.  Such reports should not be taken as evidence that the  
 Iranian  people share  their government’s  views, and should  not  be used as a pretext for  
 using force against Iran’s population…The  general public does  not consider the nuclear  
 issue to be of vital importance.  Nuclear  technology  will do little for the average Iranian       
 –   it cannot create more jobs for a country that needs one million jobs annually, it cannot  
 Change the chronic low efficiency,  productivity  and  effectiveness  of  the  economy  and  
 management, and  it  will  do  nothing  to improve Iran’s commercial ties with the rest of        
 the world. 206 
 
 
Likewise, Christopher de Bellaigue indicates,   
 
 
 Iranians who vocally support their country’s nuclear ambitions tend to be strong supporters  
 of the Islamic Republic, and they are a minority.  In today’s sullenly depoliticized Iran, it is  
 the  mundane  issues  that  animate  people: the  price  of  staple  products, for instance, or  
 changes in terms of required military service.  In the four and a half years that I have lived  
 in Iran…I have  never  witnessed  a spontaneous discussion of the nuclear program among  
 average Iranians…It’s  unlikely  that  many  Iranians  would  be  willing to put up with the  
 economic and diplomatic  isolation  that  would  likely  result  if  Iran insisted on enriching  
 uranium.  And the Islamic Republic would hesitate to ask them to do so, for it is the regime,  
 not the international community, that would feel the backlash.207 
 
 
Eventually, having experienced one of the bloodiest wars of the second half 
of the twentieth century, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Iranians do not want any 
adventure, conflict or confrontation to be developed out of the nuclear programme.208  
Neither do they have any desire for any international isolation.  To be sure, they want 
to live in a country where their economic needs are met and where they can carry out 
their businesses in a stable environment.  Given the economic difficulties, Iranians 
do not want to be subject to further economic sanctions for the sake of the nuclear 
programme.   To sum up, the nuclear issue is a matter of national pride for the 
average Iranian only as long as her/his primary needs are covered and they believe 
that it is not worth of entering this or that sort of any war.  
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 2.4 OVERVIEW 
 
It would be appropriate to suggest that at present in Iran, there is not any 
compromise both among divergent political factions and within the Iranian public on 
how the handle the nuclear issue.  With respect to internal politics; the radical 
conservatives, the mainstream conservatives, the pragmatists, and the reformists have 
considerably different ideas about how to deal with the nuclear dispute that leads to 
tension among Iran and the international community.  The converging point of view 
among these political factions is that they have all underlined their desire to see Iran 
as an independent, developed and technologically advanced state.   Yet, they have 
disagreed on how to achieve an Iran with these above mentioned qualities.  Nuclear 
capability has been one of these critical qualities that has long been discussed in the 
political circles.    
Actually, the main difference among Iranian factional approaches to nuclear 
issue arises from their divergent foreign policy views.  Here, the main distinction is 
between those who favor accommodation with the West such as reformists and 
pragmatists and those who strongly oppose any accommodation with the West such 
as radical hardliners.  There are also those who approve conditional accommodation 
with the West such as mainstream conservatives meaning that their approval depends 
on changing circumstances.  To put it differently, there is a division between those 
political factions who emphasize the significance of compromise in solving the 
nuclear dispute including the reformists and the pragmatists and others for whom any 
compromise with the West is unimaginable including the hardliners.  Mainstream 
conservatives occupy a middle ground among these two political tendencies, playing 
a balancing role.    
The election of Ahmedinejad represents a major turning point in Iranian 
politics.  As Ehteshami and Zweiri argue, with Ahmedinejad’s presidential victory, 
Iran has entered “new and uncharted waters in both its domestic politics and foreign 
relations”.209  Current Iranian parliament is dominated by radical conservatives and 
mainstream conservatives and Iran’s current nuclear policy is a combination of these 
two factions’ visions.  Recent parliamentary elections which took place on 14 March 
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2008 resulted in mainstream conservatives’ gaining apparently more seats than any 
other political group. Yet, the cabinet is still dominated by the hardliners and this 
would also change with the forthcoming 2009 presidential elections.  Overall, Iranian 
policy would be subject to change if the composition of the parliament changes.  
However, it should not be forgotten that unelected institutions such as the position of 
the supreme leader are very influential in Iranian politics. 
Public debate is another theme that was analyzed in this chapter.  It appears 
that for an average Iranian the nuclear issue is not as prioritized as economic welfare.      
What also matters for the Iranian street is the combination of costs or consequences 
as result of insisting on a technology without having the consent of major powers.  
International isolation and further economic sanctions mean genuinely high prices 
for the Iranian public that they can not afford.  Public polls, manipulated by the 
Iranian regime, have been used by the Iranian regime as well to enhance its 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the international community in relation to negotiations on 
the nuclear issue.  The ruling regime has aimed to buttress its legitimacy too through 
exploiting Iranians’ sense of nationality that has been provoked making references to 
Western double standards. Lastly, the possibility of Ahmedinejad administration 
possessing nuclear weapons would strengthen the hands of the hardliners, leading to 
a serious increase in the repressive and authoritarian nature of their policies.
 55 
CHAPTER THREE 
IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY 
 
Iranian nuclear issue is part of domestic struggle in Iran. It is also a regional 
and international issue. As indicated in the previous chapter Iran’s policy on 
particularly nuclear issue has caused serious concern among the international 
community. The EU-3 engaged in a dialogue aimed at resolving the crisis, but this 
aim has failed in 2005. Eventually, the IAEA has referred this issue to the UN 
Security Council in 2006. Since Iran has refused to halt enrichment of uranium, the 
UN imposed three sets of sanctions in 2006, 2007 and 2008. Besides, the USA has 
established economic sanctions against Iran.  
Recently, it seems that a new period of power struggle and bargaining over 
the Iranian nuclear issue started. The EU tries to start talks with Iran while the 
rhetoric between Washington and Tehran grows more aggressive. Presently, in 
addition to its nuclear programme, NATO has been discussing Iran’s ballistic missile 
program and concerned about missile launches from Iran. Moreover, Iran has been 
accused of supporting terrorist organizations. All of these challenges are also hold a 
high priority for Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has to follow the developments 
closely since Iran is a neighbor to Turkey. Also due to security and energy interests, 
regional developments are a matter of concern for Turkey. In regard to the aim of 
this thesis, here, emphasis will be given to the implications of nuclear issue for 
Turkey, which will be analyzed after an overview of relations between Iran and 
Turkey. 
3.1. OVERVIEW OF RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND TURKEY 
 
Turkey and Iran share a 310-mile border and as indicated by the Turkish 
foreign ministry the two countries have been at peace for centuries.210 It is 
noteworthy that though both countries are Muslim, Iran is mainly Shiite, while 
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Turkey is Sunni. Furthermore, in Iran there is a religious and authoritarian regime 
where as in Turkey there is a secular and democratic regime. As there are political 
and ideological differences, it is important to regard their mutual relationship in this 
regard.  
Relations between the two countries can be examined in three periods. The 
first period covers the years from the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the 
Iranian Revolution. In the 1920s, Turkey and Iran pursued similar foreign policy 
goals of resisting to territorial demands by outside forces. In 1926 and 1932, the two 
countries signed Treaties of Friendship and Security and formed the Saadabad Pact 
in 1937. After the World War II, both countries followed a policy of alliance with the 
West. By 1955 the Cold War had stabilized and President Eisenhower was following 
the policy of containment. Under this international context, in order to prevent Soviet 
intervention, Turkey and Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Together with 
England, Pakistan and Iran have joined this Pact in the same year. The name of the 
Pact was changed to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959 after Iraq 
pulled out, but it survived until 1979. In fact, until the Islamic Revolution, Iran and 
Turkey continued their cooperation and as Bishku argues bilateral relations were 
reasonably good with similar foreign policy principles.211 
The second period of bilateral relations covers the years between 1979 and 
1997.  After the Revolution in Iran, some conflicts were observed in their relations.  
Nevertheless, during the Iran-Iraq War for eight years, starting from 1980 Turkey 
followed a policy of neutrality.  Iran on the other hand, actively assisted Kurds in 
order to open another front against Iraq.212  In 1983, the PKK terrorism intensified in 
Turkey and heightened gradually.  As stated by Laqueur, during the 1980 and 1990s 
“Iran became the main sponsor of terrorism.” 213  Thus, Turkey felt threatened 
especially due to attempts of Iran to export the Iranian revolution and support given 
to the PKK until the late 1990s.214  In 1992, major threat for Turkish security was 
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defined as Kurdish separatism.  In 1997, radical Islamism (irtica) and Kurdish 
separatism were identified as major threats to Turkish security. 215  In addition, in the 
first half of the 1990d, problem in bilateral ralations were onserved due to claims on 
Iranian involvement  in political assasination of Turkish intellectuals.  It is stated that 
the main suspects in the assassination of the intellectuals were having Iranian 
connections.216  In the second half of the 1990s, especially Iran’s support of the PKK 
raised serious problems.  In this respect, Ankara claimed that Iran trained the Turkish 
Islamist radicals and supported terrorist activities.  Moreover, as Ozcan stated “the 
tension turned out to be a crisis in February 1997 when the Iranian ambassador 
Muhammad Baghai attended to address an Islamist gathering called ‘the Night for 
Jerusalem’ expressing critical views in public on Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel 
and close relations with the USA.” 217  Furthermore, in May 1990, the former Turkish 
Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, has accussed Iran of trying to export its own Islamist 
ideology to Turkey and helping the separatist PKK terrorists. 218  
 On the other hand, from Iran’s vantage point, Iran hesitated to develop 
relations with Turkey due to Ankara’s pro-Western orientation and close relations 
with the West.  Also, Iran has been cautious about Turkey’s growing political and 
military relationship with Israel.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, two 
countries engaged in competition to influence over the Central Asia and Caucasia 
and to incerase economic and political relations with the new Republics.  A Turkish 
world from the Adriatic to the Chinese wall became a slogan in Turkish foreign 
policy.  However, towards the mid of the 1990s it became obvious that Russia would 
                                                                                                                                     
Brussels, August 2004, pp. 24-25; Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushirravan Ehteshami and  
Jerold Green, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, RAND, Santa Monica  CA, 
2001, pp. 65-6; Nihat Ali Ozcan, “Iran’ın Turkiye Politikasinda Ucuz Ama Etkili bir Manivela: PKK 
[A Cheap but Influent Level in Turkey Policy of Iran: the PKK]”, Avrasya Dosyası, Vol.5, No.(3), 
1999, pp. 325-43; Ely Karmon (1997), “Radical Islamic Political Groups in Turkey”, Middle East 
Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol.1, No.4, 1997. 
215
 Pınar Bilgin , “Rethinking Turkey’s Security Discourse: The Challenge of Globalization,” paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Boston, 
MA. August 29-September 1, 2002. 
216
 Gencer Ozcan, “Turkey’s Changing Neighbourhood Policy”, The Turkish Yearbook of 
International Relations, Vol.35, 2004, p. 8. 
217
 Ozcan, “Turkey’s Changing Neighbourhood Policy,” p. 9. 
218
 “World: Turkey Accuses Iran,” BBC News, 09.05.1999, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/339308.stm (12.06.2008). 
 58 
not tolerate their regional influence. 219  That is not to say that the potential between 
Turkey and Iran has disappeared.  But it shifted towards competition to become 
energy transportation route after 2000.  Besides, Turkey’s security environment has 
not improved with the end of the Cold War.  Just on the contrary, insecurities have 
incerased as observed in the Balkans and the Northern Iraq. 220 
The third period of bilateral relations covers the years from 1997 to present.  
During President Khatami’s government starting from 1997, Iran’s quest to export 
the revolution beyond its borders, its support for the radical Islamic groups in Turkey 
and for the PKK has gradually declined.  President Khatami was a moderate who 
striving to promote regional stability and to improve relations with Turkey as well as 
the West.  As Iran’s “terrorist operations directed against Western countries” were in 
decline,221 Turkey’s perceived threats from Iran have diminished. 222  Thus, Turkey 
preferred to approach Iran more tolerably.  Nevertheless during the years 2000-2001, 
before American attack on Iraq, issues relating to the Axerbaijani-Armenian conflict 
and the PKK terrorism dominated bilateral relations. According to Olson in these 
issues Turkey had taken a stronger position vis-à-vis Iran. Particularly, competition 
between two countries to become main energy route to transport the Central Asian 
energy sources (oil and natural gas) to the world market has intensified.223 
Nevertheless, despite competition and conflicting interests, they avoided serious 
confrontation, thus bilateral relations have improved with Khatami’s moderate 
policies. 224 
Iran has remained isolated after the Revolution in 1979 though during 
President Hatemi’s period Iran has tried to decrease tension and develop relations. It 
still has no diplomatic relations with Washington, and relations with Europe are still 
distant. After the US occupation of Iraq in March 2003, the US had more reason for 
lessening Iran’s power since it did not want a regional hostile power on the borders 
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of Iraq. Thus, Iran is faced with a unilateralist superpower and much stronger Israel 
in the Middle East. US actions and attitudes also affect Iran’s relations with Turkey 
in the region.225  
After September 11 Turkey has supported US campaign against terrorism. 
Turkey has even taken the command of UN forces in Afghanistan in 2002. Turkey 
has also strong relationship with Israel. Yet, Turkey is unhappy with the changes in 
the region after the US occupation of Iraq in 2003. The policies pursued by the US in 
Iraq and against Iran had the potential to negatively affect Turkish interests. Thus, 
Turkey preferred to cooperate with Iran and Syria rather than completely following 
the American policies. However, it is clear that Turkey would like to also continue 
its relationship with the US and the EU. 226 
Having said that Turkey’s relations with Iran have transformed in the last 
years as Tehran acted against the PKK and given support to Turkey in the fight 
against the PKK. Iran’s change of behavior is related to its converging interest with 
Turkey in regard to Iraq, fight with PKK terrorism and energy deal. The Iranian 
behavioral change is coupled with friendly neighborhood policy adopted by the JDP.  
Particularly, the JDP government has given high priority to the EU 
membership in its foreign policy. Within the Europeanization process, since 2003 it 
adopted a ‘policy of zero problems’ with neighboring countries to develop political 
and economic relations with its neighbors.227 According to Ozcan, “The dynamics of 
Turkish politics have transformed since Turkey received a status of candidacy in 
December 1999228. Increasing prospects of EU accession has been exerting 
tremendous impaction on Turkish foreign policy.” In this regard, Iranian-Turkish 
relations started to show the signs of gradual improvement after 1999. Additionally, 
Turkey is in pursuit of increasing its influence on the global stage, namely in Europe, 
Central Asia and the Middle East. Today, both Iran and Turkey are competing to be 
important regional actors. Yet, Turkey prefers its relations with other global actors to 
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be complementary and not in competition229, thus, following a balanced and multi-
dimensional foreign policy. Within this policy Turkey’s approach to the Middle East 
has changed. Aim is to find a solution to existing problems with neighbors. In 2002, 
it is indicated that the bilateral relations with Iran, Iraq and Syria would be improved 
though Iran’s aspirations of development of nuclear power and WMD and its 
continued support for the PKK were considered as sources of threat. 230  
Furthermore, in recent years, it is observed that the JDP’s approach in foreign 
policy is to be more active in the Middle East and even be a facilitator in some 
regional conflicts in which Turkey previously had avoided to be involved. According 
to Cengiz Candar, a well-known Turkish journalist and commentator on foreign 
policy, “Turkey today is playing its role the way it is supposed to be, owing this to 
the collapse of the Saddam regime and increasing Iran’s influence in the region.”231 
Overall, despite the fact that there are still conflicts between the two countries, there 
is hope for improvement of cooperation in the last decade232, as cooperation has been 
observed on security and economic relations. The opening of pipeline construction, 
high-level visits between two countries, Tehran’s support for the Turkish fight with 
the PKK, economic and educational cooperation are signs of improving relations. 
Recent relations between two countries will further elaborated below. Yet, the main 
focus is Iranian nuclear issue. Nevertheless, accepting the difficulty to address one 
issue in isolation from other major bilateral issues and interests, implications of the 
nuclear issue will be analyzed by adopting a comprehensive approach. 
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3.2. IMPLICATIONS OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR ISSUE FOR TURKEY 
 
3.2.1. Recent Security Concerns  
 
For Turkey Iran’s nuclear programme does not constitute a high priority. 
Specifically, Iran and Turkey are preoccupied with another major issue- the PKK 
terrorism in Turkey and the PJAK terrorism in Iran. However, though Turkey does 
not approach Iran’s nuclear programme as exposing an existential threat for itself, 
Turkey does not want proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. Besides, 
Turkey had also some hesitations on nuclear programme of Iran.  Yet, Turkey 
rejected sanctions against Iran and supported constructive engagement policy to 
prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Thus, Turkey is interested in the 
EU’s attempts to engage in dialogue with Iran.233 
In regard to nuclear issue, firstly, Turkey’s relations with the EU, specifically 
its search to secure full EU membership, mainly determine its policy. Secondly, 
Turkey seems to balance security concerns of the US, Israeli and European allies.234  
Thirdly, the JDP’s foreign policy goal of ‘zero problems with neighbors’ affects its 
policy. Fourthly, for security and economic reasons, it is likely that Turkey might 
pursue a neutral course.  Fifthly, Turkey cannot disregard its regional alliance with 
Syria and Iran especially on the critical issue of the PKK.235 
Turkey would not favor a military strike by the US against Iran or increase of 
tension between the two sides.  Specifically, Turkey prefers Iran not to continue its 
nuclear programme before convincing the international community about its peaceful 
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intentions, and at the same time wishes that international community would not 
engage in a military action against Iran.  Overall, Turkey wants a dialogue with Iran, 
and Iran without nuclear weapons. 
Considering Turkey’s revival for quest of nuclear energy, is Turkey in search 
for nuclear weapons due to Iran’s nuclear programme? This would be a dramatic 
departure from long-standing Turkish policy and not expected.236  Kibaroglu said, 
“Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, however, has been the key issue in 
Turkey’s official stance toward the spread of weapons of mass destruction.”237  As 
highlighted by Turkish Foreign Ministry, Turkey has signed the NPT and supported 
international efforts towards nonproliferation of WMD. As being party to the NPT 
agreement Turkey is in search of nuclear energy for peaceful means.238  As indicated 
by Energy Minister Hilmi Guler,  due to Turkey’s dependence on natural gas 
imported from Russia and Iran, Turkey is in need for nuclear energy, and not in quest 
for becoming a nuclear power. 
3.2.2. Increasing Security Cooperation 
 
Similar to the EU, Turkey has also been engaged in a dialogue with Iran on 
addressing regional concerns. Particularly after the Iraq war (2003), Turkey 
cooperated with Iran, because Iran (and Syria) as well as Turkey has been against the 
increased autonomy of Kurds in the region, given the potentially destabilizing effect 
they may have on their own states.239  For its part, though earlier in the 1980s and 
1990s Iran had supported the PKK terrorism, has started to be concerned about 
Kurdish terrorism in the region. Thus, both countries felt a necessity to establish 
firmer control over their borders. In this respect, Turkey considers Iran as an ally in 
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its fight against the PKK (the Kurdistan Worker’s Party)240 – KADEK terrorists, who 
operate in Iran under the name of PJAK241 (the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan)242.  
“The Kurdish conflict in Turkey intensified in 1991-92 after the Gulf War.”243  The 
mass movement of Kurds from the border of Iraq and Iran contributed to increase in 
conflict. The threat of an autonomous state in Iraq was (and still is) considered as a 
major threat.244  Thus, Turkey did not (and still does not) want an independent 
Kurdish state to appear in northern Iraq and did not want “the Kurds to control the oil 
and gas fields of northern Iraq.”245 Turkey’s official policy was to support the 
territorial integrity of Iraq.  
Today Turkey considers the PKK terrorism as a major threat to its security 
while Iran considers the PJAK terrorism and the US as major threats. For Iran, 
resisting the autonomy of Kurds in the region is considered as a part of their fight 
with the US hegemony in the region as well as concerned with its effects on its own 
security.246  
In the last decade the two countries have held the ‘Turkey-Iran High Security 
Commission Meetings’ and exchanged official visits. Though the Commission was 
established in 1988, bilateral security cooperation has especially improved with the 
Justice and Development Party government since 2002.247  During the Commission 
Meetings, they have discussed about bilateral cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism and border security. In the 12th round of meetings in April 2008, the two 
countries had signed a memorandum of understanding to promote their security 
cooperation and discussed measures to deal with threats posed by the outlawed PKK 
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and the PJAK terrorism.248  The commander of Turkey’s land forces Gen. Ilker 
Basbug informed that Turkey and Iran, even though not conducting joint operations 
against the terrorists, are sharing information and coordinating their operations.  
The Turkish military was authorized on October 2007 to launch operations 
against the outlawed PKK terrorism and thus, launched cross-border operations into 
northern Iraq in December 2007.249 In February, another military operation is 
launched against the PKK, which lasted for 8 days. After the operations Iraq 
president Talabani visited Turkey in March 2008. The visit was first since he became 
president in 2005.250  Talabani has earlier told, “Iraq does not approve the presence 
of the PKK combatants and their armed acts. It cannot tolerate them when they go 
into Turkey and kill people then return to our territory.” But he also objected 
extensive Turkey’s military action. Yet Talabani realized that Turkey has not 
targeted Iraqi regime or Kurdish civilians in these operations, but the PKK 
combatants. He has highlighted that with the JDP government a democratic climate 
in Turkey has developed which is favorable to Kurds. 251  
Despite the conflicts between Iran and the US, today Iran has also relations 
with Iraq. President Talabani has visited Iran for several times. Furthermore, Iranian 
President Ahmedinejad had visited Iraq in March 2008.252  This was the first visit by 
an Iranian president after the revolution in 1979. After the Iranian revolution there 
was a war between the two countries that lasted until 1988. Relations since then were 
hostile. Despite the hostility, which lasted many years, and despite US invasion of 
Iraq five years ago, Baghdad has welcomed a president, which openly condemns 
American presence in Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki said his talks with 
Ahmedinejad had been “friendly, positive and full of trust.”253 Especially Kurds and 
Shiites in Iran were pleased with Ahmedinejad’s visit. It seems that Iran has 
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benefited from US invasion of Iraq by the overthrow of Iran’s opponent –Saddam 
regime. 
 In short, presently, Turkey and Iran have similar concerns over Iraq and 
Kurdish separatist terrorism, thus felt the necessity to increase their security 
cooperation. 
 
3.2.3. Energy Concerns and Deal for Gas 
 
Turkey’s energy policy is driven by several concerns. Firstly, Turkey tries to 
establish a vital role for itself for energy (oil and gas) transportation mainly with the 
Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Blue Stream, Nabucco and Samsun-Ceyhan pipelines. 
The BTC pipeline, which has opened in May 2006, runs from the Sangachai terminal 
in Azerbaijan via Georgia to Ceyhan in southern Turkey. The pipeline will have an 
annual capacity of 50 million metric tons of oil. The US has supported the BTC 
pipeline. The Blue Stream gas pipeline, which has opened in 2003, runs from Russia 
along the bottom of the Black Sea to Samsun in northern Turkey. The pipeline will 
have an annual capacity of 16 billion cubic meters. The Nabucco project is still in its 
initial planning phases and has been slowed by high costs and uncertainty over 
sources of supply. The construction of pipeline will start in 2009 and in the best 
scenario will be opened by 2012. The project aims to deliver 30 billion cubic meters 
of gas annually from Central Asia and the Caspian region to Europe through a 3,300-
kilometer pipeline from eastern Turkey via Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary to 
Austria. The EU and the US are strong supporters of the Nabucco pipeline.254 
“Turkey has said that the Iranian and Turkmen gas can be used for the planned 4.6 
billion euro ($6.3 billion) Nabucco project, which will carry gas across Turkey and 
the Balkans to central Europe and is backed by the European Union.”255 Construction 
of Samsun- Ceyhan oil pipeline has started in the mid 2006, which will transport 1 
million barrels of oil.  
As recently there are concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme and Russian 
energy politics, Turkey has potential to emerge as an important player in energy 
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transport from energy-rich Central Asia and Caucasia to energy-demanding 
European states. But Turkey needs to build the infrastructure for storing gas and re-
exporting to Europe. Yet, BOTAS, the state owned gas company in Turkey, cannot 
make these investments alone since these pipelines are very expensive to build. 
Though, the government is aware of the need for energy market reform, because of 
political disagreements there has been little progress. 256 
Turkey’s second concern is becoming a regional actor. It is considered that 
becoming a major Eurasian energy corridor and energy hub would also increase 
Turkey’s geopolitical standing. Being a regional actor will be further elaborated in 
the next section. 
Thirdly, Turkey tries to lower energy prices and increase alternative energy 
resources. Power demand in Turkey is rapidly growing. “Despite the 25 percent 
growth in Turkey, electricity production rates have remained almost unchanged 
because of lack of investment in the sector.”257 Lack of power could do serious 
damage to Turkey’s fast growing economy. Turkey has very limited oil and gas 
reserves and thus cannot meet the rapidly rising demand. Currently, natural gas 
amounts for almost 50 percent of energy consumption, and expected to increase to 60 
percent next year.258 A Russian company Gazprom provides over half of Turkey’s 
natural gas demand, which arbitrarily increases the prices. Though Turkey tries to 
keep good relations with Russia, it also wants to diversify its energy sources and to 
decrease its dependency on Russia, since it cause great danger for Turkey. 259  In this 
respect, Iranian gas would reduce Turkey’s dependence on Russian supplies. Iran 
supplies close to a fifth of Turkey’s natural gas supply. Turkey’s dependency on 
Iranian gas is 20 percent compared to 65 percent from Russia.260 Meanwhile, Russia 
is developing alternative projects. Yet, Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler denied 
the existence of rivalry between two countries. Furthermore, in February 2008 
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Foreign Minister Babacan said Turkey was open to including Russian gas in the 
Nabucco project.261  
With these concerns, Turkey has signed an energy agreement with Iran in 
2007. Turkey has agreed to establish a joint company to carry up to 35 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas from Iran (and from Turkmenistan) via Turkey to Europe and 
to construct three thermal power plants by Turkish companies in Iran.262 In fact, an 
energy agreement was signed between the two countries as early as 1996. Despite 
US objections, Turkey signed another agreement with Iran in 2000 to begin 
importing natural gas.263 According to these agreements Iran was going to re-export 
gas that it had provided from Turkmenistan.  
In short, Turkey seems decided to continue in energy cooperation with Iran. 
Lately, in September 2007 at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, 
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan held a meeting with Ahmedinejad on planned 
natural gas deals, Iran’s nuclear program, and a joint combat operation plans against 
terrorism. Yet, the details of the meeting are not announced to public. At the same 
time, Turkish Prime Minister Babacan held a meeting with US counterpart Rice on 
Turkey’s energy cooperation with Iran, PKK terror, Cyprus, the Middle East Peace 
Process and awaiting so called Armenian genocide resolution at the House of 
Representatives. These meetings were held just a day after the US adopted a bill to 
tighten economic sanctions against Iran. The US considers that energy agreements 
with Iran are unacceptable.264 Besides, Washington wants to eliminate Iran in 
transporting the Caspian oil and gas, whereas Iran sees itself as a natural transit route 
to world markets. 
In contrast to American attitudes, Iranian gas exports to Europe are of much 
interest to latter, since EU wants to develop alternative energy sources to Russia.265  
At present, the EU gets around a quarter of its gas from Russia. The European recent 
energy policy emphasizes the diversification of sources of supply.  Thus, pipeline 
connection from Iran is both in interest of Turkey and the EU. 
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As stated by the EU Energy Commissioner Piebalgs, the EU values Turkey’s 
role in energy transportation.266  Yet, EU law requires all member-states to open their 
pipelines for companies from other countries. The Energy Community Treaty was 
signed in 2005 and in force since June 2006 to create the legal framework for an 
integrated energy market.267  Nine partners of South East Europe - Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and UNMIK on behalf of Kosovo have signed the ECT. 
Turkey has an observer status and negotiations with Turkey are ongoing for joining 
the treaty at a later stage.  Recently, the EU invited Turkey to join the ECT and 
demands Turkey’s commitment for energy market reform and regulations, in order to 
develop European energy cooperation with Turkey.268 
Ironically, it might be possible for Iran to force Turkey to stay out of any 
Western efforts in containing Iran’s disputed nuclear programme by using its 
dependence on Iranian gas supply.269 Besides Iran arbitrarily cuts gas supply to 
Turkey without any acceptable excuse, leading to gas shortage in Turkish economy. 
Thus, Iran’s cooperation to provide gas has not been easy and efficient for Turkey.270 
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For example, after an explosion on a gas pipeline Iran reduced supplies in May 2008. 
This explosion is observed with the sabotage of the PKK. Russian company 
Gazprom said that they would increase natural supplies from 22 to 30 million cubic 
meters per day to Turkey.271  
In short, Turkey has planned energy deals with Iran. Yet, also, Turkey 
searches for alternatives. Thus, Turkey revitalized support for a series of pipeline 
prospects presently on the agenda. In addition, new energy projects, including those 
relying on nuclear power were brought to fore in the recent years.272 Nevertheless, 
Turkey tries to follow a careful and balanced policy toward the US and Iran urging 
both sides to adopt constructive policies.273   This is not easy for Turkey. Even 
though, Turkey tries to follow an independent policy from the US to solve Iran-
related security problems in the region, its cooperation with Iran might put in trouble 
its strategic relations with the US. 274 Accordingly, Turkey does not want to act alone 
toward Iran’s nuclear programme and prefers to support unified efforts of the 
international community. In this regard, Turkey closely follows the EU’s attitude on 
this issue.  
 
3.2.4. Turkey’s Search for Regional Role 
 
Though Turkey has not felt threatened by directly Iran’s nuclear programme, 
what is vital will be potential increase in the regional status and influence of nuclear 
Iran that might threaten the regional power balance.275  Additionally, Iranian 
influence can intensify not only in the Middle East but also in Central Asia and 
Caucasia. Furthermore, nuclear Iran might have more potential to export Islamic 
ideology abroad.276  In this regard, while Turkey is benefiting from US support, Iran 
is under pressure from the US-led embargo. Yet, according to the Turkish foreign 
minister Ali Babacan, US effort to impose sanctions and isolate Iran ironically 
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increases power and regional influence of Iran. So Turkey prefers dialogue and 
diplomacy.277  
During his visit to Lebanon in June 2008 for to attend the Arab Economic 
Forum held in Beirut278, Erdogan further said that, “Turkey set the world’s agenda; to 
ignore this is not right.”279 Besides becoming an energy hub to increase its 
geopolitical standing, according to foreign policy advisor of Turkish prime minister, 
Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey would like to be a facilitator in regional conflicts.280   
From the Turkish governments point of view these efforts might increase role of the 
Turkey in the region as well as in the eyes of other global actors. 
Recently, we have observed two issues where Turkey would like to play a 
facilitator role: between Israel and Syria, between international community and Iran. 
In June 2006, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul during his visit to Tehran told 
that Turkey could be a facilitator to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis. Iran’s reaction 
was quite positive towards the Turkish efforts. Ahmedinejad said, “Turkey can play a 
determining role in regional and international issues together with Iran.”281   
Furthermore, recently Ankara has been encouraging to restart negotiations 
between Israel and Syria. These peace talks are the first talks since the collapse of the 
Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations in may 2000. The JDP government considers that 
Turkey’s cooperation with Israel and role as a facilitator to Israeli-Syrian relations 
might further increase Turkey’s regional role. Syrian and Israeli officials have met in 
Turkey under the Turkish mediation on May 21, 2008. As a facilitator, Turkish 
diplomats have met separately with two countries officials and informed two sides 
about the meetings. In addition, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni visited Turkey 
in May 2008 as the first visit to a foreign country after his appointment to this 
position, which indicates that Israel really pays attention to relations with Turkey.282 
Though it is not clear if Turkey has power to find a solution to Israeli-Syrian conflict, 
it is evident that Turkey wants to play a role in bringing stability and security to the 
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Middle East and to enhance its regional status. Israel and Syria announced that they 
had begun an open dialogue with the aim of a comprehensive peace. However, Israeli 
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told that Syria have to “distance itself completely” from 
“problematic ties” with Iran and stop “supporting terror-Hezbollah, Hamas.” Syria 
has rejected the precondition.283 The complications related to the peace talks are 
beyond the scope of this analysis.  
In paradox, Iran is highly concerned with developing relations between Syria 
and Israel under Turkish mediation. In the Middle East, Iran-Syria and Israel-the US 
were considered as two opposite camps, thus any agreement between Syria and Israel 
is against the interests of Iran. Yet, Syria has so far does not seem to change its 
cooperation with Iran. Recently on May 26, 2008 Syrian Defense Minister has 
visited Iran and signed memorandum of understanding regarding defense issues.   In 
addition, Iran’s Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar confirmed his 
country’s “strategic ties” with Syria based on mutual interests. Meanwhile, the US 
said it did not oppose to meeting between Syria and Israel but repeated its 
disapproval of Syria’s “support for terrorism.”284     
In short, there is a complexity for both Turkey and Iran to maintain their 
influence in the region. 
 
3.3. OVERVIEW 
 
 
Turkish policy toward the Iranian nuclear issue is closer to the European than 
the American approach given the potential of bilateral cooperation in policy toward 
the PKK and energy deal. Thus, the Turkish attitude toward the Iranian nuclear 
programme shows similarities to the European attitude. It appears that Turkey does 
not oppose Iran’s search for peaceful nuclear energy. Yet, Turkey does not want 
spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and Iran to acquire nuclear capability, 
which might lead to an increase in regional security dilemma and regional role of 
Iran. Furthermore, Turkey does not want the escalation of crisis between the US and 
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Iran, and to have any new war in the region. Thus, Ankara prefers diplomacy and 
Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA in finding a solution to Iran’s nuclear puzzle. As 
announced by the Turkish foreign ministry, Turkey supports international 
community’s efforts to provide a negotiated solution through diplomacy. 
Accordingly, Turkey believes that the EU-3 can play a constructive role.  
Moreover, in the recent years there is a growing activism of Turkish foreign 
policy in the Middle East. It can be argued that the Turkish Prime Minister advisor 
Ahmet Davutoglu is forming the theoretical infrastructure of Turkey’s relations with 
neighbors. Davutoglu favors Turkey to be in good relations with neighbors and 
become a regional power.285  Thus, the JDP government tries to increase influence of 
Turkey in the neighboring regions and develop good relations with neighbors. In this 
regard, Turkey’s image in the eyes of Muslim countries is changing. Yet, Turkey 
also wants to improve relations with Israel. Consequently, it can be also argued that 
Turkey can be a facilitator in diplomatic initiatives as a trustworthy negotiator from 
both the perspective of Iran and the international community.286 Yet, so far the 
international community has preferred the diplomatic efforts of the EU-3 vis-à-vis 
Turkey.
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 CONCLUSION 
 
Having analyzed international, regional and domestic dimensions of Iran’s 
nuclear programme, three sets of conclusions can be made.  The first set of 
conclusions is related with the international dimension of Iran’s nuclear programme.  
The first chapter including a detailed analysis on the attitudes of the USA, the 
EU/EU-3, Russia and China has shown that there is no common comprehensive 
agreement on the solution toward Iran’s nuclear programme.  The EU have been in 
favor of ‘critical dialogue’ with Iran in hope to solve the crisis through direct 
negotiations.  However, with the election of the President Ahmadinejad, Iran’s 
nuclear programme became more problematic which led to a shift on the EU’s policy 
towards Iran.  With a new approach, the EU acted with the USA taking the Iranian 
nuclear issue to the UN Security Council.  The USA has favored ‘an active 
containment’ policy toward Iran, hoping to isolate the Iranian regime, thereby 
causing a ‘regime change’ in Iran. As a part of its ‘active containment’ strategy, the 
USA has not only supported a number of sanctions ranging from political to 
economic, but also has repeated references to military action.  Russia and China, on 
the other hand, have not regarded Iranian nuclear programme as an existential threat.  
The Russian and the Chinese approaches toward Iran’s nuclear programme have 
signaled a resistance to US hegemony and control over the Middle East and Central 
Asia.   
Overall, what emerges from the analysis of the international dimension of 
Iran’s nuclear programme is that attitudes of the international community with 
respect to Iran’s nuclear puzzle have not been monolithic. Yet, after years of having 
different approaches toward Iran’s nuclear programme after the 1979 Revolution, 
there have been a change to a common position among the approaches of the USA 
and the EU/EU-3 in 2005 – that can be called as the ‘Western approach’, vis-a-vis 
the approaches of Russia and China. Russia and China has supported the diplomatic 
bargaining of the EU-3 rather than imposing sanctions advocated by the USA. 
Considering the overlapping issues of concern, this article put forward an optimistic 
scenario that might lead to successful solution on Iran’s nuclear puzzle based on the 
EU’s method of diplomacy. 
 lxxiv 
Second set of conclusions is related with the analysis of Iranian domestic 
debates with the respect to nuclear issue.  This analysis through the second chapter 
has revealed that at present in Iran, there is not any compromise both among 
divergent political factions and within the Iranian public on how the handle the 
nuclear issue.  Iranian political factions including the radical conservatives, the 
mainstream conservatives, the pragmatists, and the reformists have considerably 
different ideas about how to deal with the nuclear dispute that leads to tension among 
Iran and the international community.  Yet, these political factions converged on the 
common desire to see Iran as an independent, developed and technologically 
advanced state.   
The major difference among Iranian factional approaches to nuclear issue 
arises from their divergent foreign policy views.  Here, the main distinction is 
between those, who favor accommodation with the West such as reformists and 
pragmatists and those who strongly oppose any accommodation with the West such 
as radical hardliners.  There are also those who approve conditional accommodation 
with the West such as mainstream conservatives meaning that their approval depends 
on changing circumstances.  To put it differently, there is a division between those 
political factions who emphasize the significance of compromise in solving the 
nuclear dispute including the reformists and the pragmatists and others for whom any 
compromise with the West is unimaginable including the hardliners.  Mainstream 
conservatives occupy a middle ground among these two political tendencies, playing 
a balancing role.    
Public debate is another theme that was analyzed in the second chapter.  It 
appears that for an average Iranian the nuclear issue is not as prioritized as economic 
welfare.   What matters for the Iranian street is the combination of costs or 
consequences as result of insisting on a technology without having the consent of 
major powers.  International isolation and further economic sanctions mean 
genuinely high prices for the Iranian public that they can not afford.  Public polls, 
manipulated by the Iranian regime, have been used by the Iranian regime as well to 
enhance its bargaining power vis-à-vis the international community in relation to 
negotiations on the nuclear issue. 
 lxxv 
Eventually, the third set of conclusions is arisen from the analysis of regional 
dimension of Iran’s nuclear programme with a special emphasis on Turkey’s 
approach.  This analysis through the third chapter has demonstrated that the Turkish 
attitude toward the Iranian nuclear programme shows similarities to the European 
attitude.    Turkey has not opposed Iran’s search for peaceful nuclear energy. Yet, 
Turkey has been against the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and fears 
that Iran’s quest for nuclear capability might lead to an increase in regional security 
dilemma. Also, Turkey does not want the intensification of crisis between the USA 
and Iran, and to have any new war in the region. Thus, Ankara prefers diplomacy and 
Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA in finding a solution to Iran’s nuclear puzzle.  As 
announced by the Turkish foreign ministry, Turkey supports international 
community’s efforts to provide a negotiated solution through diplomacy. 
Accordingly, Turkey believes that the EU-3 can play a constructive role.  
The third chapter of the thesis as well points out that in the recent years there 
is a growing activism of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East since the JDP 
government has tried to increase influence of Turkey in the neighboring regions and 
to develop good relations with neighbors.  Thus, it can be argued that Turkey can be 
a facilitator in diplomatic initiatives on the Iranian nuclear issue nuclear as a 
trustworthy negotiator from both the perspective of Iran and the international 
community. 
The results of recent Iranian parliamentary elections that took place on 14 
March 2008 were neither surprising nor expected.  In line with the previous 
parliament, conservatives won the majority of the seats in the Iranian Majlis.287  The 
disqualification of a large proportion of the reformist candidates by the ruling has 
certainly contributed to this outcome, maximizing the chance for a conservative 
victory. Yet, the astonishing aspect of these results was that it signaled a growing 
divide between radical conservatives (hardliners) allied with President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad and mainstream conservatives (moderates) who are critical of 
Ahmadinejad’s policies.  Many of the conservative winners are from the ranks of 
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moderates, who have disapproved President Ahmadinejad’s economic policies and 
his confrontational rhetoric with the West, particularly on the nuclear issue.  In the 
immediate aftermath of the parliamentary elections a new power struggle within the 
conservative camp has emerged in the Majlis.  On the one hand, there are those 
hardliners who support Ahmedinejad’s aggressive economic and foreign policies 
whereas on the other there are those moderates who have been gathered around 
former nuclear negotiator and current Majlis speaker Ali Larijani.288   
Overall, current Iranian parliament is dominated by radical conservatives and 
mainstream conservatives and Iran’s current nuclear policy is a combination of these 
two factions’ visions.  Recent parliamentary elections which took place on 14 March 
2008 resulted in mainstream conservatives’ gaining apparently more seats than any 
other political group. Yet, the cabinet is still dominated by the hardliners and this 
would also change with the forthcoming 2009 presidential elections.  Iranian foreign 
policy with respect to nuclear issue would be subject to change if the composition of 
the parliament changes.  However, it should not be forgotten that unelected 
institutions such as the position of the supreme leader will continue be very 
influential in Iranian politics. 
To conclude, no real solution with respect to Iranian nuclear dispute is 
expected in the short term, but there can be an opportunity for an agreement under a 
new American administration along with a new government in Iran after 2009, since 
the new US President will be elected in November 2008, and the new Iranian 
President will be elected in mid-2009. It is rather difficult to keep international 
consensus –above all in the Security Council- over how to address the Iran’s nuclear 
puzzle, particularly on escalating sanctions, while China and Russia have hesitations.  
In the aftermath of the forthcoming US presidential elections, there might be 
reconsideration on the question of how to deal with Iran’s nuclear puzzle. The 
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 lxxvii
optimistic   scenario   may  be   the  next  US   administration’s opt for staying on the 
diplomatic track, the next Iranian administration’s willingness to cooperate with the 
international community, the reestablishment of the EU’s locomotive role in 
designing a deal with Iran’s nuclear puzzle and granting Turkey a mediatory role in 
negotiations with Iran 
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